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1. Introduction 
 In this paper, we explore the importance of the supply of capital for corporate financing 
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decisions. We choose two exogenous events, membership to the European Union (EU) and the 
adoption of the Euro, which caused a shift in stock and credit market conditions and impacted 
on European integration. Our paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we examine 
the capital structure implications of this unique integration experience initiated by the 
establishment of the EU, which preceded the introduction of the Euro. Several studies have 
examined the economic implications of this integration process. For example, earlier research 
has looked at the impact on bond and equity markets (e.g., Lane, 2006; Hardouvelis et al., 2006; 
Bekaert et al., 2013), on firms’ foreign exchange exposures (e.g., Bartram and Karolyi, 2006) 
and on banking activities (e.g., Spiegel, 2009; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010).1No study has 
looked at the impact on firms’ financing choices.  
 Secondly, our paper contributes to capital structure theories by focusing on the supply-side 
effects. Supply-side effects arise when imperfections exist in capital markets. If the supply of 
capital is infinitely elastic at the correct price as assumed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
then debt levels are determined solely by the firm’s demand for debt. There is recent evidence 
to suggest that supply conditions are important inputs to capital structure decisions. For 
example, Leary (2009) explores the relevance of capital market supply frictions for corporate 
capital structure decisions by studying the effect on firms’ financial structures of two changes 
in bank constraints, the 1961 emergence of the market for certificates of deposit and the 1966 
credit crunch.  His results lend support to the role of credit supply and debt market segmentation 
in capital structure choice. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) present evidence that firms with 
bond rating have higher leverage ratios than those without after controlling for the demand for 
debt.  The authors interpret this result as suggesting that debt segmentation may put constraints 
                                                 
1
 For a more complete list of studies see Bekaert et al (2013). 
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on some firms’ ability to borrow so the observed leverage ratios may not reflect those 
demanded. 
 To test how the supply of capital affects capital structure choices one has to identify 
exogenous shocks that directly affect the supply of capital without directly affecting the trade-
offs that firms face due to their corporate characteristics that influence these capital structure 
choices. The adoption of the Euro is an example of such an exogenous event as described by 
Titman (2002). “In 1999, European currencies were effectively merged into a single currency, 
the Euro. Prior to conversion, there were illiquid and inactive bond markets in the individual 
currencies in Europe. Basically the markets were small and illiquid. Therefore investors did 
not want to hold French Franks and DM bonds. By creating the Euro, European corporations 
can issue corporate bonds in a single currency which is likely to result in a single more active 
and more efficient market.” (Titman, 2002 p.113-114).In this paper, we investigate the 
adoption of the Euro and its impact on corporate financing choices through the supply of debt 
capital.2. 
 Prior to the adoption of the Euro, European countries had to join the EU created in 1993 
with the signing of the EU Treaty, commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, which 
allowed for the free movement of goods, capital, people and services between EU members 
and the implementation of EU directives to harmonise regulation of capital markets and 
financial services. The establishment of the EU enhanced the countries’ access to international 
capital and allowed foreign equity ownership. The new financial environment expanded firms’ 
financing choices, especially those of the smaller countries that had originally the least 
developed financial markets. Bearing in mind the findings of Bekaert et al. (2013) that equity 
                                                 
2It is possible that there could have been demand-side effects as a result of the adoption of the 
Euro as well. We describe how we control for them in detail in the next section.  
 5 
 
market integration in Europe was mainly achieved during accession to the EU, while the launch 
of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the adoption of the Euro had a non-significant 
impact, we consider membership to the EU as an exogenous event that affects capital structures 
of firms through the supply of equity capital.  We delineate the impact of the two phases of 
European integration accordingly; the country’s membership to the EU, which improves access 
to equity capital; and the country’s adoption of the Euro, which improves access to debt capital. 
 Our work draws from two strands of literature, which have studied capital structure 
decisions in an international context.  The first one refers to the difference between bank-based 
and market-based systems and the other looks at the impact of structural changes in emerging 
economies. Our study is complementary to those but differs from them in several aspects. The 
first group of studies in this literature focuses on differences in corporate financing choices 
between bank-based and market-based systems (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995; Antoniou et al., 
2008). However, today bank-based and market-based systems are getting closer (e.g., Levine, 
2002; Beck et al., 2010).3Higher levels of credit market integration have been observed in 
market-based systems and higher levels of equity market integration have been observed in 
bank-based systems (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Assuming that firms operate either in a 
bank-based or in a market-based system underestimates the complexity of the financial markets 
today. Most firms operate in systems that exhibit characteristics of both. Our study contributes 
to the literature by examining the effect of the European integration that brings closer bank-
based and market-based systems. On the one hand, stock markets are established in every 
                                                 
3
 In fact, Levine (2002) argues that classifying countries as market or bank based to distinguish 
financial systems is not helpful as both types of financial systems promote similar levels of 
economic growth. He further discusses that what matters is the level of development of the 
financial systems and the enforcement of legal contracts. 
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European country, and FDI flows increased, while on the other hand, the introduction of Euro 
made it possible to borrow in a common currency and expand the credit markets. 4Accordingly, 
in our empirical models we control for the effects of both equity and credit market channels.  
 The second strand of studies focus on the impact of structural changes in emerging markets 
on firm financing choices through the equity market channel (e.g., Schmukler and Vesperoni, 
2006; Mitton, 2006; Lucey and Zhang, 2011). Part of the deregulation, which leads to financial 
integration, includes the relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions. It should be noted that 
foreign equity flows can follow two routes; portfolio flows through the stock market and 
foreign direct investments (FDI) flows. The effect of stock market expansion has been studied 
in detail (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Fan et al., 2012; De Jong et al., 2008). 
We introduce the impact of FDI flows on corporate choices as another channel of equity market 
integration. FDI flows precede portfolio flows (e.g., Andrade and Chhaochharia, 2010) that are 
traditionally used to measure equity market integration. This is especially important in the 
European context, whereby FDI inflows have increased from $124 billion in 1996 to $347 
billion in 20095(see Figure 1).The two types of equity market integration arising from FDI and 
                                                 
4In fact, this process is officially addressed by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(known as MiFID) of 2003 that became effective in 2007 that provides the basis of the 
European Union law that harmonizes the regulation for investment services across the 30 
member states. 
5
 However, in 2000 FDI reached $695 billion as a result of the build-up to the adoption of the 
Euro by most EU-15 countries, before declining in 2004 due to primarily large repayments of 
intra-company loans by foreign affiliates in some host countries, particularly, Germany and 
the Netherlands (WIR, 2005).  Subsequently, FDI inflows rose again due to higher intra-EU 
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portfolio flows can proceed simultaneously and interact with each other.6Hence, we control for 
both aspects of equity market integration to obtain a complete picture.  
 Our sample includes firms from both large and small economies of Europe. We have a total 
of 7226 listed firms in our sample, of which 6795 are from EU-15(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK) and 431 are from European Union new member states EU-NMS(Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). 
 Our results show that European firms increase equity financing when the country they reside 
enters the EU and debt financing when it joins the EMU. The firm level implications of 
adopting the Euro are through the credit channel that leads to increasing debt ratios and both 
short-term and long-term borrowing. We show that at the corporate level, firms increase equity 
financing as access to equity capital is expanded through accession to EU. In addition, we show 
that supply side developments in the credit markets as a result of the adoption of the Euro result 
in the use of higher debt at the corporate level confirming Titman’s (2002) expectations to that 
effect. Our results are robust to controlling for several economic and financial developments 
in equity and credit markets that took place during the European integration and to the 
moderating effects of the country of origin.  Bearing in mind that financial integration can be 
constrained by country and firm characteristics (e.g., Claessen and Schmuckler, 2007) and 
firms can overcome these obstacles with the help of globalisation (e.g., Doidge et al., 2012) we 
extend our analysis and divide our countries into EU-15; and EU-NMS, accordingly. In 
addition to our main results, we observe that in this process EU-NMS firms respond to higher 
                                                 
FDI, as NMS acceded to EU (WIR, 2006) reaching $830 billion in 2007, before declining 
again as a result of the global financial crisis. 
6FDI is defined by OECD as minimum 10% of equity ownership.  
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levels of credit market integration by increasing leverage and to greater equity market 
integration by increasing equity, while EU-15 firms that are going through EMU accession 
phase increase their debt maturities in response to these changes. It is particularly interesting 
to note that FDI flows provide a valuable source of equity financing for firms in EU-NMS, 
while it enables longer debt maturities for firms in EU-15. 
 In order to ensure that our results concerning the effects of EU and EMU do not mask the 
effects of the ongoing  globalisation process, we conduct further tests by including two direct 
indicators of financial globalisation based on  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).  Our results 
survive this test as well. We complete our analysis by looking at whether joining the EU and 
EMU offers better access to finance for small firms and try to understand if they have actually 
benefited more from European integration, and by looking at the financing decisions of non-
surviving firms to understand their survival strategies with respect to corporate financing 
choices.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the literature review and 
develops the hypotheses, Section 3 introduces the data, while Section 4 presents the research 
design. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings, while Section 6 presents robustness tests. 
Section 7 reports the analysis on small firms and non-survivor firms. Section 8 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. European integration, firm financing and hypotheses development 
2.1. Main hypotheses 
 Previous work on integration literature shows that financial integration can affect firms 
financing choices both through equity and credit markets (e.g., Kim et al., 2005; Mitton, 2006; 
Lucey and Zhang, 2011). Theory on equity market integration indicates that the cost of capital 
declines following equity market liberalization as a result of higher risk sharing, increased 
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competition, and improved information environment (e.g., Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry, 
2000; Kim and Singal, 2000; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999). This results in a decline in leverage 
and an increase in term maturities (e.g., Mitton, 2006; Schumukler and Vesperoni, 2006). Since 
Bekaert et al. (2013) show that in Europe, equity market integration takes place predominantly 
via the reduction in the cost of capital during accession to the EU rather than to the EMU, one 
would expect firms to increase equity financing during the EU accession phase.  
 During the EMU accession phase, the Euro-zone countries have to abide by the Maastricht 
criteria, which include lowering their interest rates and the rate of inflation as well as meeting 
the fiscal constraints. When they adopt the Euro, there is one interest rate, which is set by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). This process strengthens credit market integration, reduces 
information asymmetries, adverse selection and moral hazard, leading to lower costs of 
monitoring by the lenders (e.g., Levine, 2001), who reduce the cost of borrowing, which in turn 
encourages firms to increase borrowing (e.g., Giannetti and Ongena, 2009). As a result of this 
process the size of debt securities issued in the Euro area increased considerably with the 
introduction of the Euro (e.g., Lane, 2006). Although there is no work on debt maturities one 
would expect debt maturities to increase as the information environment and the external 
monitoring improve in this process. Thus, our main hypotheses are: 
H1a: European firms would increase equity financing as the country they reside accedes to EU 
and increase debt financing as it accedes to EMU.  
H1b: European firms would increase debt maturities as the country they reside accedes both to 
EU and EMU. 
 
2.2. Other hypotheses 
 Macroeconomic conditions influence the firms’ ability to raise capital and the mix of capital 
that they can raise (e.g., Erel et al., 2012).European integration took place over time and against 
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the backdrop of a global integration process, which had long lasting implications on economic 
and financial indicators, such as, economic growth, cost of borrowing, banking sector 
development, stock market expansion, and FDI flows (e.g., Fernández de Guevara et al., 2007; 
Lane, 2006; De Sousa and Lochard, 2011; Rajan and Zingales, 2003), which would have 
impacted on firms financing choices. Consequently, we control for these developments in our 
empirical estimations when we test for our main hypotheses. Additionally we investigate the 
direct impact of these changes on corporate financing choices as they have not been 
investigated in the European context before.  In the following, we develop the hypotheses 
relating to the direct impact of these economic and financial developments on the European 
firms’ financing decisions, starting with the impact of interest rates. 
 The level of interest rates is not a criterion for accession to EU, while reducing interest rates 
is one of the core criteria of joining EMU. Accordingly, countries start to lower the interest 
rates as part of their preparation to join the EMU. In particular, interest rates declined from 
11% to 5.5% in EU-15-NMS and from 7.6% to 5.5% in EU-15 during this process (Table 3). 
The decline in interest rates has a direct and immediate impact on firm financing through the 
credit market channel. Although it is possible that it is the yield curve that might matter, 
previous literature shows that lower interest rates reduce the cost of borrowing at the corporate 
level (e.g., Booth et al., 2001; Barry et al., 2008). Thus, one would expect firms to increase 
leverage and extend debt maturities.7Accordingly our second set of hypotheses is as follows:  
                                                 
7
 Studies that have used inflation rather than interest rates to proxy for the cost of debt had 
found a negative relationship between inflation and debt levels (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1999; Booth et al. 2001). We have also used inflation in alternative estimations. 
The conclusions do not change. Due to greater correlation between inflation and interest 
rates, it was not included as an additional variable in the final regression analysis. 
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H2a: When interest rates decline, firms increase leverage. 
H2b: When interest rates decline, firms increase debt maturities.  
 
 During the European integration process, economic growth rates increased mainly for EU-
NMS. Obstfeld (1994) argues that financial integration affects growth by creating more risk 
sharing opportunities and increasing industry specialization. The impact of gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth on financing opportunities has been studied empirically and the results 
vary. One line of research reports that firms increase leverage when economic growth increases 
(e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; De Jong et al., 2008). Another 
line of research reports that equity financing increases as the economy grows (e.g., Frank and 
Goyal, 2008).This differential effect could depend on the relative strengths of the credit and 
equity channels. When we consider the equity market channel, higher growth rates can be either 
financed with equity from stock markets, or from FDI. Since in Europe, FDI flows increased 
significantly during the integration process, we would expect the equity market channel to have 
a greater impact than the credit market channel and for European firms to increase equity 
financing.  
 The empirical literature on the effect of growth on debt maturity is also mixed. Fan et al. 
(2012) say that greater economic growth reduces the risk of uncertainty and, as such, firms 
would be willing to borrow more with longer term maturities. On the other hand, staggered 
debt structures can lead to debt runs by creditors when maturities increase (e.g., He and Xiong, 
2012). There is another body of empirical research that shows that the weak financial and legal 
institutions in developing countries force creditors to offer short term debt for better monitoring 
(e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). These are both credit market arguments. If 
growth during integration is financed through the equity markets, one would expect debt 
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maturities to decline as firms switch from long-term debt to equity capital as they are both long 
term alternatives (e.g., Lucey and Zhang, 2011). In Europe, we would expect growth to be 
financed mainly through the equity channel with the predominant source of external equity 
being FDI. We would expect debt maturities to decline. Thus, our next set of hypotheses is: 
 
H3a: When economic growth rates accelerate, firms increase equity financing.  
H3b: When economic growth rates accelerate, firms decrease debt maturities.  
 
 The direct effect of credit market integration on firm financing choices comes from the 
availability of funds from the banking sector in Europe. We proxy credit market development 
in our analysis with the ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP, similar to, Beck et al. 
(2010) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999).During the European integration process, 
firms are exposed to a well-established bank-based financial system and their access to bank 
loans increased. Previous literature (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; De Jong et 
al., 2008; Beck et al,. 2008) also reveals that a higher level of banking sector development is 
associated with higher levels of external finance.  
 The empirical evidence on the effect of credit market development on debt maturities is 
mixed. A series of works by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) reveal the importance of creditor 
protection in the banking sector and its effect on term maturities. In environments, where 
creditor protection is poor, banking sector development leads to shorter maturities so that banks 
monitor the firms more effectively (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Giannetti, 
2003; Bae and Goyal, 2009). Europe has a predominantly bank-based financial system and the 
credit market integration process has enhanced creditor protection for member states (e.g., 
Giannetti and Ongena, 2009). Therefore, we would expect term maturities to increase as the 
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banking sector in Europe expands. It should be noted that we control for asset tangibility in all 
estimations. Our next empirically testable hypotheses are: 
 
H4a: When the banking sector expands, firms increase leverage. 
H4b: When the banking sector expands, firms increase debt maturities.  
 
 European financial integration affects firms’ equity financing from two external channels. 
Firms can raise equity financing either from the stock markets, or from FDI. We measure stock 
market activity by the stock market turnover ratio.8The empirical literature on the effect of 
stock market activity is mixed. Financial integration decreases cost of equity capital (e.g., 
Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry, 2000; Kim and Singal, 2000; Bris et al., 2009) and thus 
increases equity financing (e.g., Agca et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2008).On the other hand, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996, 1999) report higher debt financing following equity 
market integration in emerging markets. They argue that this is due to the indirect effect of 
establishment of stock exchanges that leads to better regulation in terms of disclosure, reduced 
information asymmetries and greater external monitoring. We would expect higher stock 
market activity in Europe to increase equity financing due to higher availability of equity 
capital during the integration process. The increase in stock market activity will increase debt 
maturities as well (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Fan et al., 2012).A developed 
stock market would increase transparency and external monitoring and hence reduce preference 
of lenders to lend short-term for better monitoring. Accordingly, we hypothesize that 
                                                 
8
 We have also used stock market capitalization to GDP ratio as a proxy for stock market 
development. However, its sign was not significant in our analyses consistent with Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). 
 14 
 
 
H5a: When stock market activity increases, firms increase equity financing.  
H5b: When stock market activity increases, firms increase debt maturities.  
 In Europe, FDI is a particular source of equity financing. As it has already been mentioned 
FDI flows to European countries and especially to EU-NMS increased substantially since the 
early 2000s reaching $830 billion in 2007. The majority of the FDI came from intra-EU M&As 
that were largely the result of cross-border corporate restructuring. Bevan and Estrin (2004) 
study the FDI flows from Western European Union countries to Central and Eastern European 
countries and confirm that EU announcements have been a significant determinant of FDI 
among other common influences. They also detect unusually large FDI flows from smaller EU-
15 countries to EU-NMS during the integration process. It should be noted that FDI is a de 
facto measure of financial integration.9Previous research investigates other de facto measures 
of integration.  For example, firms adopt financing policies to overcome investment barriers in 
the form of regulatory constraints, taxes and information constraints using global equity capital 
through American Depository Receipts (e.g., Foerster and Karolyi, 1999, 2000). Foreign 
ownership matters as it improves access to capital markets. FDI is an important source of global 
equity capital for European firms. We measure FDI as the ratio of FDI inflows to GDP. For 
equity financing FDI acts as a substitute for small stock markets in EU-NMS (e.g., Claessens 
et al., 2003). In some EU-NMS, stock markets declined as a result of unsuccessful mass 
privatizations and cross-listings, which have diverted trade away from local exchanges (e.g., 
Pajuste, 2002). Doidge, Karolyi, Stulz (2012) have shown a similar case globally using IPO 
activity around the world. In the initial stages of EU accession for some of these countries 
                                                 
9See Kose et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion of de jure and de facto measures of financial 
openness. 
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domestic credit was scarce due to underdeveloped financial systems and FDI became a 
substitute for domestic credit. For Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries FDI inflows 
is the most important source of capital flows. Foreign direct investors provide additional equity 
financing to local firms (e.g., Desai et al., 2004). Foreign-owned companies may outperform 
local companies in accessing credit market. They can borrow from their parent companies or 
access to international capital markets and borrow at a considerably lower cost than the local 
companies (e.g., Blalock et al., 2008). However, the impact of FDI flows on corporate finance 
decisions has been ignored in the capital structure literature. FDI positions in a destination 
country are later followed by stock portfolio positions in that country (e.g., Andrade and 
Chhaochharia, 2010). We introduce in our analysis FDI flows as an additional measure of 
equity market integration. We would expect higher FDI inflows to result in an increase in equity 
financing and an increase in debt maturities. Therefore, our next set of hypotheses is as follows:  
H6a: When FDI increases, firms increase equity financing.  
H6b: When FDI increases, firms increase debt maturities.  
 
 In addition to controlling for economic and financial changes in Europe, we also control for 
firm level variables of capital structure that are known to affect leverage and maturity 
structures. Consistent with existing literature, we include asset tangibility (net fixed assets over 
total assets), size (natural logarithm of total assets), and profitability (return on total assets) 
(e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009). Firm-
specific variables that have explanatory power in the U.S. are used to explain firm leverage in 
other countries (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001).10This is the case for both 
                                                 
10Rajan and Zingales (1995) examine the firm-level determinants of leverage in G7 countries. 
Booth et al. (2001) analyze the financial leverage decisions of listed companies from 1980-
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bank oriented financial systems as well as market-oriented financial systems (e.g., Antoniou et 
al., 2008).11We control for firm level factors in all estimations. Finally, we control for the 
impact of current financial crisis, which caused severe debt and banking crises in some 
European countries, such as Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain on the capital structure and 
debt maturity choices of European firms by using a crisis dummy, which takes the value of one 
over the period 2008-09 and zero otherwise. 
  
3. Sample and preliminary analysis 
3.1. Sample composition 
 Our sample includes listed firms from both large and small economies of Europe.12 We have 
a total of 7226 firms in our sample, of which 6795 are from EU-15 (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) and 431 are from new member states EU-NMS (Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia).13 The 
source of firm level data is WRDS Compustat Global database and excludes financial services 
and utilities companies. Most macro economic data are collected from the World Bank’s World 
                                                 
1990 across 10 developing countries including India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey, 
Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, Jordan, and Korea. 
11
 Antoniou et al. (2008) analyse G5 countries. 
12
 Considering the fact that UK is a market-based system as opposed to the majority of EU-
15, we also conduct estimations excluding UK from the EU-15 sample and our conclusions 
do not change. 
13
 Bulgaria, Malta and Romania, although in EU are not included in the sample due to lack of 
sufficient firm-level data in the Compustat Global database. 
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Development Indicators Database (WDI April 2010). We use data from the Economic 
Intelligence Unit database for deposit money bank assets and data from UNCTAD for FDI 
inflows. Our analysis covers the period 1996 to 2009, and includes the negotiations phase, the 
accession of EU-NMS to EU and EMU, as well as the transition of EU-15 countries to 
EMU.14,15 The sample includes all the active and inactive firms and therefore, does not have a 
survivorship bias16. We have a total of 57879 observations17  
 The dependent variables measure the capital structure and debt maturity choices of firms. 
Leverage is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (TLTA) and includes trade 
credit.18 Term maturity is measured by the ratio of current liabilities to total liabilities (CLTL). 
We use two further variables to measure debt maturity; the ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
(LTDTA), and the ratio of current liabilities to total assets (CLTA). Our construction of book 
                                                 
14
 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia started accession 
negotiations at the beginning of 1998, while the remaining accession countries started at the 
beginning of 2000. The Accession countries have all entered the EU by May 2004. EU-15 
countries had already acceded to EU long before the investigation period of 1996-2009. 
15
 The implementation of EMU started in 1993 and culminated with the adoption of the Euro 
in 1999. All EU-15 states except Denmark, Sweden and UK acceded to EMU by 2001. 
Cyprus, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia from EU-NMS are newest members of EMU. 
16 Inactive firms are those that are classified in research files because they were companies  
that have been deleted from the active file due to acquisition or merger, bankruptcy, 
leveraged buyout, or because they no longer file with SEC. 
17
 Appendix A presents the number of average firm-year observations. 
18
 We conduct alternative estimations using interest bearing leverage and debt maturities. The 
results are presented in Section 6.3 and are qualitatively similar to those of our main analysis. 
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leverage follows Li et al. (2011), Guariglia et al. (2011), Claessens et al. (2008) and Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), which is comparable to Fama and French's (2002) definition of 
leverage. 
 We use an EU dummy (EU) which takes the value one if the country is in the EU and zero 
otherwise and an EMU dummy (EMU), which takes the value one if the country is in EMU 
and zero otherwise. Acknowledging, however that the countries had to adopt some measures 
as stated in the Maastricht Treaty drafted in 1991 in preparation for joining EMU, so that the 
impact of EMU might have started earlier than the formal accession date to EMU, we use an 
alternative measure for the Euro effect to capture that phase, and check the robustness of our 
results, based on the elimination of exchange rate volatility. European countries reduced the 
volatility of their exchange rates before adopting the Euro by fixing them relative to the 
Deutsche Mark before 1999 and to the Euro after that.19 As a result we use a variable (EVEMU) 
which is based on the realized exchange rate volatility, �(the square root of the sum of squared 
daily exchange rate changes during a year) for all countries and years. It is then transformed 
onto a [0,1] scale, where a country with zero exchange rate volatility takes on a value of one; 
a country with 1% monthly volatility would take on a value of zero. The rest of the macro 
economic variables are defined as follows. We measure the cost of borrowing with the lending 
interest rates (INT).20 We gauge economic growth with the growth rate of real GDP 
(GRRGDP). We use three measures to control for access to finance. The first one is the ratio 
                                                 
19
 We thank Geert Bekaert for suggesting this alternative measure and providing the data for 
it, which is used in Bekaert et al. (2013). 
20
 Lending interest rates are taken from WDI and defined as the bank rate that usually meets 
the short- and medium-term financing needs of the private sector and we use the data 
reported in WDI for each country and year. 
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of deposit money bank assets to GDP (DMGDP), which is a proxy for the size and development 
of the financial sector (e.g., Beck et al., 2010; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).21The 
second measure of access to finance is the stock market activity. We use the stock market 
turnover ratio (SMTO), which is the total value of shares traded during the period divided by 
the average market capitalization for the period.22 A higher ratio implies a more developed 
stock market (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; DeJong et al., 2008). The third 
measure of access to financing is the ratio of inward FDI Flows to GDP (FFGDP). It is an 
indicator of world integration through direct investments. Finally, we measure the impact of 
the current global financial crisis with a dummy (CRISIS), which takes the value one during 
2008-2009 and zero otherwise. 
 We use the following measures for firm level determinants of leverage. We measure 
tangibility as the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets (NFATA), size as the log of total assets 
(SIZE) and profitability as the return on assets ratio (ROA). 
 
 
 
3.2. Preliminary analysis 
 We start our preliminary analysis with the stylised facts about leverage and debt maturities 
of firms in Europe (see Table 1). We make some interesting comparisons of corporate leverage 
                                                 
21
 It should be noted that other studies have used different proxies, e.g. Booth et al. (2001), 
and Fan et al. (2012) use liquid assets to GDP measure, while Beck et al. (2008) use private 
credit to GDP ratio. 
22
 Average market capitalization is calculated as the average of the end-of-period values for 
the current period and the previous period. 
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and debt maturities of firms in EU-NMS and EU-15 countries; of firms before and after 
accession to the Euro (The EU and EMU membership dates for all the countries are given in 
the last columns of panels A and B of Table 3); of small firms compared to large firms; and of 
survivor firms compared to non-survivor firms (see Table 2).  
 Panel A in Table 1 presents the mean leverage and debt maturities of firms in EU-NMS, 
while panel B of firms in EU-15 countries.23 Column 1 reports the number of firms in each 
country during our sample period, and column 2 reports the leverage levels in every country. 
As it can be seen the range for leverage in EU-NMS is from 30% for Latvia to 51% for 
Slovakia, while in EU-15 countries the range is from 46% for Ireland to 66% for Portugal.  
 We make the following observations concerning comparisons between the various sub-
groups (see Table 2). First, leverage in EU-NMS is significantly lower than in EU-15 countries, 
it is 45% compared to 54%.  Secondly, for both groups of countries leverage had increased in 
post EMU period. Firms in EU-15 (EU-NMS) countries increased their leverage from 50% 
(44%) to 57% (52%). Thirdly, small firms in EU-NMS have similar leverage to small firms in 
EU-15 of 44%.  Fourthly, small European firms in EU-NMS (EU-15) have significantly lower 
leverage than their large counterparts, of 46% (63%). Finally, non-survivor firms of both 
country groups have significantly higher leverage than their survivor counterparts. In EU-NMS 
(EU-15) non-survivor firms have leverage of 49% (56%) compared to 46% (53%) for survivor 
firms. 
 We turn now to debt maturities. Column 3 in Table 1 reports the means for debt maturity 
measured as the ratio of current liabilities to total liabilities, while columns 4 and 5 report 
results for two additional measures of debt maturity, namely the ratio of long-term debt to total 
                                                 
23We applied a cut-off of zero and one for both debt maturity and leverage to avoid the effect 
of outliers. This resulted in a deletion of 2571 observations in total. 
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assets and current liabilities to total assets ratios.  Our discussion refers to column 3, since the 
other two columns present in general a similar picture. As it can be seen the range for the ratio 
for EU-NMS varies from 58% for Lithuania to 76% for Poland, while the lowest ratio in the 
EU-15 is 55% for Luxembourg and the highest 72% for the UK.  
 We make the following observations concerning comparisons between the debt maturities 
of various sub-groups (see Table 2). First, the firms in EU-NMS have shorter debt maturity of 
71% compared to 67% for firms in EU-15 countries. Secondly, firms in EU-NMS andEU-15 
have similar debt maturities in post EMU period. Thirdly, small firms in both EU-NMS and 
EU-15 have significantly shorter debt maturities, compared to the larger firms 77%  (compared 
to 56%) and 79% (compared to54%) respectively. Finally, non-survivor EU-NMS (EU-15) 
firms’ current liabilities are 66% (68%) of their total liabilities, compared to 71% (66%) for 
survivor firms, Thus, non-survivor firms in EU-NMS have longer debt maturity than survivor 
firms, while non-survivor firms in EU-15 have shorter debt maturity than survivor firms. 
 Subsequently, we report the stylised facts about the firm level determinants of capital 
structure and debt maturities in European countries. First, EU-NMS firms have higher asset 
tangibility of 42% compared to firms in EU-15 countries of 26%. Secondly, small firms in EU-
NMS and EU-15 countries have significantly lower net fixed assets (than large firms), with an 
asset tangibility ratio of 34% (56%) and 18% (33%), respectively. Thirdly, firms in EU-NMS 
are significantly smaller than firms in EU-15 countries. Fourthly, EU-NMS firms are also more 
profitable than EU-15 firms. The average ROA is 6.6% for EU-NMS firms, whereas it is 1.4% 
for EU-15 firms during our sample period24. Finally, Non-survivor firms as expected are less 
profitable than survivor firms both in EU-NMS and EU-15 countries.  
                                                 
24
 Profitability decreases in the post-EMU period for both EU-15 and EU-NMS firms. This is 
most probably due to the current financial crisis that coincides with the post-EMU period. 
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 The summary of stylised facts about the financial and economic indicators of the European 
integration process and related discussion is given in the Appendix B. Appendix C presents the 
Pearson correlation coefficients between all variables. 
 
 
4. Research Design 
 We investigate the impact of membership to EU and EMU on corporate financing decisions 
of European firms. We control for firm level determinants suggested by capital structure 
theories in all our estimations. As explained earlier, European integration took place in two 
phases, membership to EU followed by the membership to EMU. Motivated by Bekaert et al. 
(2013), who showed that most of equity market integration took place during this first phase 
of European integration, membership to EU, we start our analysis by testing the impact of 
membership to EU on corporate financing choices. We expand the model by adding the EMU 
indicators in order to test the additional impact of the adoption of Euro on corporate financing 
decisions through the credit channel. We then add the control variables for the financial and 
economic indicators of the European integration process through the equity and credit market 
channels to test whether membership to EU and the adoption of the Euro had an impact beyond 
the impact of the on-going financial and economic developments in these countries. Following 
the research strategy just outlined, we estimate the following baseline model to test hypotheses 
1 through to 6 developed in Section 1: 
ܦ�ܾݐܴܽݐ���,�,� = ߙ� + ߚଵܧ �ܷ,� + ߚଶܼ�,� + ߚଷܺ�,� + ߚସ �ܰ,�,� + ߚହܥݎ�ݏ�ݏ� + ��,� 
where DebtRatio is one of the four leverage and debt maturity ratios for firm i, in country cat 
time t, and stands for the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (TLTA), the ratio of current 
liabilities to total liabilities (CLTL), the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (LTDTA), and the 
(1)
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ratio of current liabilities to total assets (CLTA). EU is the European Union Accession dummy, 
Zc,t stands for the vectors of EMU indicators that are the European Monetary Union accession 
dummy (EMU) and the exchange rate volatility based indicator (EVEMU). Xc,t stands for the 
vectors of the financial and economic indicators of the European integration process through 
the equity and credit market channels and includes the growth rate of real GDP (GRRGDP), 
the lending interest rates (INT), the deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio (DMGDP),stock 
market turnover (SMTO), and inward FDI flows to GDP ratio (FFGDP). Ni,c,t stands for the 
vectors of firm-specific control variables and includes net fixed assets to total assets ratio 
(NFATA), the log of total assets(SIZE)and the ROA calculated as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets (PROFITABILITY). Crisis is the dummy for the 2008-2009 
crisis, and i,t is the error term. The crisis dummy is added when we include the macro factors. 
 We use Ordinary Least Squares panel estimation with fixed effects to allow for firm specific 
intercepts and capture the unobserved firm characteristics that do not change overtime.25,26We 
follow Brav (2009) and lag all macro-economic and firm specific variables by one period to 
                                                 
25The Hausman test (1978) confirms the use of fixed effects estimation for panels. While firm 
fixed-effect estimations would control for industry factors, we also run alternative estimations 
using random effects model with industry dummies in all subsamples. The results are 
qualitatively similar and the conclusions do not change. 
26
 As the objective of the paper is not investigating the speed of adjustment to target capital 
structures, we do not use lagged values of the dependent variable as explanatory variable in 
the model and hence we do not employ dynamic panel estimation models such as two-step-
system GMM (Antoniou et al. 2008). Furthermore, Hovakimian and Li (2012) show that 
partial adjustment models fail to provide economically significant indicators for dynamic 
trade-off models.   

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handle possible endogeneity issues. Since the residuals may be correlated across firms and/or 
across countries, and OLS standard errors may be biased, standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level as described in Petersen (2009).27Using IV estimation gives similar results (results 
are not reported but can be made available on request).28 
 Subsequently we extend our analysis to control for the moderating effects of country of 
origin for firms in EU-NMS and EU-15 countries on the relation between European integration 
variables and corporate financing choices. Previous studies show that the economic and 
financial development levels differ in old and new member states in Europe (Allen et al., 2006). 
Accordingly, firms that operate in less developed EU-NMS could benefit more from European 
financial integration as financial development can increase the supply of funds and stimulate 
external financing of firms (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998) more in these countries. Thus, we 
expect these changes to have a more pronounced impact on the capital structure choices of EU-
NMS firms via both credit and equity market channels. In the meantime, we predict that the 
impact of European financial integration would be more pronounced on the debt maturities of 
EU-15 firms as they already operate in more developed financial systems. Therefore, in order 
to investigate whether European integration exerts a differential impact on the leverage and 
debt maturity choices of EU-15 and EU-NMS firms, we pool these countries together into two 
groups, EU-NMS and EU-15 and interact the European integration indicators with the dummy 
variables for EU-15 and EU-NMS. Our approach is similar to the approach used by Brav (2009) 
in his investigation of capital structures of unlisted firms. We interact all macro-economic and 
                                                 
27
 We also check for two-dimensional clustering. As standard errors of the fixed effects 
model with year level clustering is lower than the White (1980) standard errors, we prefer to 
use 1 dimensional clustering rather than 2. 
28
 Instruments are past values of right-hand side variables in alternative estimations. 
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firm-specific variables with the EU15 and the EU-NMS dummies and report F-tests of equality 
of coefficients of the interaction terms. The dummy for EU-15 (EU-NMS) takes the value 1, if 
the firm resides in a EU-15 country (EU-NMS) and zero otherwise. Accordingly, we next 
estimate the following model, where we include interaction terms to investigate the moderating 
effects of country of origin: 
 ܦ�ܾݐܴܽݐ���,�,� = ߙ� + ߚଵܧ �ܷ,� + ߚଶܧܸܧܯ �ܷ,� + ߚଷܺ�,��ܧܷ15 + ߚସ �ܰ,�,��ܧܷ15 +ߚହܺ�,��ܧܷܰܯܵ + ߚ଺ �ܰ,�,��ܧܷܰܯܵ + ߚ଻ܥܴ�ܵ�ܵ� + ��,� 
 
We finally repeat the estimations first for small firms and secondly for non-survivor firms 
to investigate whether their corporate financing choices are different. We rank firms according 
to their total assets measured in millions of Euros in EU-NMS and EU-15 samples separately. 
Each subsample is then split into quartiles and firms that belong to the bottom 25th percentile 
are defined as small firms. The average small firm sizes in EU-15 and EU-NMS samples are 
respectively 12 and 10 million Euros. Non-survivor firms are the companies that became 
inactive during the research period according to Compustat database. The database also 
classifies companies that were involved in M&A’s as inactive companies. However, we do not 
include them in our analysis as non-survivors. The non-survivor firms in our sample are the 
companies who were either (i) liquidated, (ii) bankrupt or (iii) have no longer files with SEC. 
Accordingly, approximately 6.5% of EU-15 countries’ firm-year end observations and 4% of 
EU-NMS countries’ firm-year end observations were classified as non-survivors. 
 
5. Empirical evidence 
5.1. Capital structures 
(2) 
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 In this section we first present results of the baseline model for leverage described in 
equation 1 (Table 4).  In Model 1, we examine the impact of EU, while in Models 2 and 3 we 
add EMU and EVEMU indicators respectively to test the additional impact of the Euro on the 
corporate financing decisions of European firms. In Models 4 and 5, we add the indicators of 
macroeconomic developments, which were going on at the same time as the accessions to EU 
and EMU. In all estimations, the coefficient estimates for firm-specific determinants of capital 
structure when they are significant have the expected sign in accord with capital structure 
theories. 
 In Model 1, we observe that the coefficient estimate for the EU dummy is negative 
indicating that firms increase equity financing following EU membership of the country they 
reside.29  Adding the EMU dummy in Model 2 does not affect either the economic or statistical 
significance of the EU coefficient. We further observe that the coefficient estimate for the EMU 
dummy (EMU) is positive indicating that firms increase debt financing following the country’s 
membership to EMU, confirming the differential impact of the two phases of the European 
integration. The robustness of our results is confirmed when we use the time varying foreign 
exchange based EMU indicator (EVEMU) reported in Model 3. The coefficient estimate for 
EVEMU indicator is positive and significant indicating that firms increase leverage as an EU 
member country prepares to adopt the Euro. Firms increase equity financing during the 
country’s accession to the EU and debt financing during its accession to EMU. This confirms 
our main hypothesis H1a. 
 During the European integration process most of equity market integration took place as 
countries joined the EU.  However, credit market integration is accentuated with the 
introduction of the Euro as a common currency. According to our results, EU accession 
                                                 
29
 A decrease in the debt ratio implies an increase in equity financing. 
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increases equity financing by 2.8% and accession to Euro increases debt financing by 1.1% 
when we use the EMU dummy and 2.7% when we use EVEMU indicator for the adoption of 
Euro. The integration process in Europe has affected capital structures both through the equity 
and credit market channels with the economic significance of the equity market channel being 
comparable to that of the credit market channel. Countries in Europe first accede to EU and 
then to EMU. Thus, time-wise equity market integration starts earlier than credit market 
integration. Our results are in line with Bekaert et al. (2013) that equity market integration has 
taken place during the EU accession and but not due to the adoption of Euro. Firms in Europe 
benefit from equity market integration by increasing equity ratios. Supporting evidence is 
provided by Doidge et al. (2012) through international IPO activity and by Erel et al. (2012) 
through cross-border mergers that financial globalization makes it easier to issue equity. Firms 
benefit from the adoption of the Euro as a common currency by increasing their debt ratios. 
The time varying measure of adoption of the Euro is scaled between zero and one thus 
indicating that in fact when the country finally adopts the Euro the average firm increases debt 
financing by about 2.1%.  
 We test the robustness of our results by controlling for the effect of financial and economic 
indicators of European integration on capital structures (Models 4 and 5). The results are 
robust, the impact of EU and EMU remain statistically significant. This implies that the impact 
of the country joining the EU and EMU on firm level capital structures choices was additional 
to the impact of the other financial and economic developments taking place during the 
European integration process. In Model 4 the economic significance of joining the EU 
increases, indicating that following accession to the EU, ceteris paribus, firms increase their 
equity ratio by 4.4%. Similarly, following the adoption of the Euro, ceteris paribus, firms 
increase their debt ratios by 1%. In Model 5 we report results from estimations with the time 
varying, exchange rate volatility based EVEMU indicator variable. The results are robust to 
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the inclusion of financial and economic variables of European integration process through the 
equity market and credit market channels. Both the EU and the time varying measure of 
EVEMU indicator are statistically and economically significant. Following the accession to the 
EU, ceteris paribus, firms increase their equity ratio by 4.2% and following the adoption of the 
Euro, ceteris paribus, firms increase their debt ratios by 2%.  These are our key results.  
 We now turn to our other hypotheses relating to the impact of the financial and economic 
indicators of European integration. Since the impact of financial and economic variables is 
similar in estimations using the dummy variable for EMU and the time varying Euro indicator 
variable, EVEMU, we continue our discussion with reference to the estimations, which employ 
the time varying Euro indicator variable in Model 5. The coefficient for interest rates (INT) is 
negative indicating that as interest rates decline, firms increase leverage, which confirms our 
H2a hypothesis. When interest rates decline by 1%, firms increase leverage in their capital 
structures by 0.29%. Lower interest rates reduce the cost of borrowing for European firms and 
increase leverage accordingly.  
 The coefficient for growth rate of real GDP (GRRGDP) is negative, indicating that firms 
increase equity financing as the economy grows during the European integration. The growth 
rate of GDP can affect firms’ capital structure choices both through the credit and equity 
channels as discussed by previous researchers. Our results confirm our H3a hypothesis that in 
Europe economic growth affects capital structure choices of firms through the equity market 
integration channel rather than the credit market channel. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Frank and Goyal (2009) that high growth rates in the economy increase the 
profitability of firms and firms use internal sources of equity capital to finance growth.  
 The positive impact of stock market (SMTO) indicates that higher levels of stock market 
activity lead to higher leverage in European firms. This confirms our H5a hypothesis. Stock 
market activity stimulates the credit markets, as listed firms become more transparent and 
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external monitoring is enhanced, increasing the availability of bank financing. However, this 
could be driven by the EU-15 countries, which are already operating in a well-established bank-
based system and therefore we would expect them to be able to increase their debt financing. 
The EU-NMS, however, might respond differently and as equity financing becomes available 
either via the stock market or FDI we would expect firms to increase equity financing. We 
further elaborate on this result in the next section, where we discuss the moderating effects of 
firms’ country of origin on the corporate financing choices. The lack of impact of FDI of 
corporate leverage might be due to this differential response of the two groups of countries.
  
 
 
5.2. Debt maturities 
 In this section, we examine the effect of European integration on debt maturities. Tables 5 
and 6 report the results. Although we are concentrating on Table 5, the ratio of current liabilities 
to total liabilities to measure debt maturities, supplementary information is provided in Table 
6 where we use the ratios of long term and short term liabilities to total assets in Panels A and 
B respectively. We note that the dummy variable for EU is not statistically significant in 
Models 1, 2,3 and 5 indicating that acceding to EU does not have significant impact on debt 
maturities. The EU dummy is significant and positive only in estimations reported in Model 4. 
Debt maturities decline as countries join the EU. Combined with earlier findings on leverage 
this result shows that firms replace long-term debt with equity financing when the country they 
reside joins the EU as discussed by Lucey and Zhang (2011).  
 The EMU dummy is positive and significant suggesting lower debt maturities, while the 
time varying exchange rate volatility based EMU indicator (EVEMU) is insignificant in all 
estimations reported in Table 5. However, supplementary information from Table 6 shows that 
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the ratio of both long term and short term debt to total assets increases similarly as the countries 
join the EMU with respect to both indicators EMU. This confirms our previous findings that 
accession to EMU affects corporate financing mainly through the credit market channel. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Goyal and Wang (2013), who show that firms 
increase short-term debt if they expect to be able to borrow with more favourable terms in the 
future. We observe in Model 5 that with the adoption of the Euro, the ratio of long term debt 
to total assets and ratio of short-term debt to total assets increase proportionately by 1%. This 
is a confirmation that the accession to EMU had a positive effect in accessing the credit 
markets. Accordingly, firms were able to increase both types of debt.  
 Looking now at the impact of the economic and financial indicators, we first note that results 
from Models 4 and 5 in Table 5 are similar. The coefficient estimate for interest rates (INT) is 
positive, suggesting that firms increase debt maturities as interest rates decline. The evidence 
is supportive of our H2b hypothesis. This is consistent with Barry et al. (2008) that lower interest 
rates reduce cost of borrowing and corporations increase debt maturities. The coefficient 
estimate for growth rate of real GDP (GRRGDP) is also positive indicating that as the growth 
rates in the economy increase European firms decrease their debt maturities. This confirms our 
H3b hypothesis. The coefficient estimate for size of the banking sector (DMGDP) is negative 
confirming our H4bhypothesis that firms increase debt maturities as banking sector develops. 
Consistent with our prediction reforms during the European integration process, such as 
improvements in investor rights and contract enforcement, makes short-term lending for 
monitoring purposes redundant. Accordingly, as the cost of monitoring declines, banks lend 
long-term and firms increase debt maturities. The coefficient estimate for stock market activity 
(SMTO) is also negative, showing that firms increase debt maturities as stock market activity 
increases. This confirms our H5b hypothesis and the results of previous research that higher 
stock market activity stimulates the credit market channel through higher transparency and 
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better external monitoring, thereby resulting in increased debt maturities (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1999; Fan et al., 2012). The coefficient estimate for FDI flows (FFGDP) is 
negative. The evidence supports our H6b hypothesis that firms increase debt maturities as FDI 
flows increase during the European integration process. Foreign owned firms can borrow from 
their parent companies, or from international capital markets at lower costs than local 
companies can borrow (e.g., Blalock et al., 2008). We show that when European firms, access 
international capital markets with the help of their foreign direct investors they can also extend 
their debt maturities. 
 European integration process has affected corporate financing choices through the credit 
market and equity market channels. It is facilitated by declining interest rates that resulted in 
higher leverage and longer debt maturities, the latter being further extended by the expansion 
of the banking sector. Higher growth rates in European economies were financed mainly 
through the equity channel at the firm level. We also observe that the equity market channel 
both through the stock market and FDI flows helped increase term maturities. Firms had the 
opportunity to shift to long term financing both through the equity and credit channels in this 
process. We shall discuss the details of the moderating effects of the country of origin of these 
firms on the relation between their capital structure and debt maturity choices and financial and 
economic developments in Europe in the next section. We will show that our key results remain 
unchanged when we control for the differences in the economic and institutional conditions of 
countries in EU-15 and EU-NMS. 
 
    6. Robustness tests  
 In this section, we test the robustness of our key findings and explore the impact of the 
supply of capital on corporate financing decisions by first taking into account the effects of 
globalisation, second the moderating effects of the differences in the economic and institutional 
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environments of the EU-15 and EU-NMS, bearing in mind that the general environment that 
firms operate in might influence the opportunities they have; and thirdly, by repeating all 
estimations using an alternative measure of leverage, which includes only interest bearing debt 
ratios and excludes trade credit as a means of financing. 
 
6.1. Do the effects of EU and EMU mask the effect of globalisation? 
 EU and EMU took place against the backdrop of the globalisation process.  In order to 
ensure that the effects of EU and EMU do not mask the effects of this ongoing  globalisation 
process we conduct further tests by including in equation (1) -and concentrating on the 
EVEMU indicator as in our earlier discussion-two direct indicators of integration based on  
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and extracted from their web page. The first measure of 
international financial integration is based on portfolio equity and FDI stocks and is defined as 
follows: ܩܧܳ �ܻ,� = ܲܧܳ��,� + ܨܦ���,� + ܲܧܳܮ�,� + ܨܦ�ܮ�,�ܩܦ �ܲ,�  
 
where PEQA (PEQL) denotes the stock of portfolio equity assets (liabilities) and FDIA (FDIL) 
denotes the stock of direct investment assets (liabilities). The second measure is IFIGDPit and 
is defined as follows:  
 �ܨ�ܩܦ �ܲ,� = ܨ��,� + ܨܮ�,�ܩܦ �ܲ,�  
where FA (FL) denotes the stock of external assets (liabilities). It is aggregate foreign assets 
and liabilities including portfolio equity assets (liabilities), direct investment assets (liabilities), 
debt assets (liabilities), financial derivatives and official reserves (excluding gold holdings).  
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 Results for both globalisation measures on capital structure and debt maturities are presented 
in Tables 7 and 8.30 In Table 7, we observe that in Model 1 the coefficient estimate for GEQY 
is insignificant while the coefficient estimates for EU and EVEMU remain significant 
confirming the robustness of our results. As before the coefficient estimate for EU is negative 
indicating firms use more equity when they enter the EU and the coefficient estimate for 
EVEMU is positive indicating firms use more debt as they enter the Euro zone. The coefficient 
estimates for GEQY and EVEMU are insignificant in Model 2. The supplementary information 
reported in Models 3 and 4, indicate that the ratio or both long term and short term debt to total 
assets have increased similarly (1% and 1.3% respectively) in response to the firms entering 
the Euro zone, while the negative and significant coefficient estimate for GEQY indicate that 
higher portfolio equity flows resulted in lower long-term debt. 
 In table 8 we report results with estimations using IFIGDP as an additional variable to 
control for globalisation. IFIGDP measures international financial integration and proxies for 
globalisation in terms of all foreign assets and liabilities.  The coefficient estimate for IFIGDP 
is insignificant in Model 1 but negative and significant in Model 2 indicating that when 
financial integration accelerates through globalisation, leverage is unaffected but term 
maturities become longer.  In Model 1, as before the coefficient estimate for EU is negative 
indicating firms use more equity when they enter the EU and the coefficient estimate for 
EVEMU is positive indicating firms use more debt as they enter the Euro zone. In Model 2, 
the coefficient estimate for EU is insignificant, while the coefficient estimate for EVEMU is 
positive and significant suggesting lower debt maturities. The supplementary information 
reported in Models 3 and 4 of Table 8 indicate that the ratio of both long term and short term 
                                                 
30
 Due to data availability for globalisation indicators the sample period ends in 2007. Please 
refer to http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.htmldata on GEQY and IFIGDP variables. 
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debt to total assets have increased when firms enter the EMU. However, as before, when firms 
enter the EMU the ratio of long term debt to total assets increases by 1.1% and the ratio of 
current liabilities to total assets increases by 1.3% indicating that the impact of EMU is similar 
for both maturities. 
 
6.2. Moderating effects of EU-15 and EU-NMS 
 We use interaction terms in order to evaluate the differential impact of the two country 
groups, EU-15 and EU-NMS, on the relation between corporate financing choices and the 
economic and financial indicators of the European integration process we have used in our 
earlier estimations. The results of the estimation of equation (2) for both capital structure and 
debt maturities are presented in Table 9. Panel A reports the coefficient estimates, and Panel B 
the p-values for the F-test of the equality of coefficient estimates of the interaction terms with 
the two groups of countries. The first thing we note is that our key results do not change with 
respect to the impact of EU and adoption of Euro on leverage and debt maturities. European 
firms increase equity financing as the country they reside accedes to the EU and increase debt 
financing as it accedes to the EMU. 
 We then turn to discuss briefly the additional information from the moderating effects of 
domicile of the firms. Previous work shows that economic and financial development levels 
are different in EU-15 and EU-NMS (Allen et al., 2006). Firms that operate in less developed 
new member states could benefit more from European Financial Integration as financial 
development can increase the supply of funds and stimulate external financing more in these 
countries. Thus we expect these changes to have a more pronounced impact on new member 
states firms both via equity and debt channels. The impact of European financial integration 
can be more pronounced on debt maturities for firms from member states as they have more 
developed financial systems. We start with the analysis of the capital structure decisions 
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reported in Column 1 of Table 9 and then elaborate on the debt maturities. The results for EU-
15 firms are similar to the main results presented in Tables 4-6. Similar to EU-15 firms, EU-
NMS firms also increase leverage when interest rates decline and increase equity capital when 
the economy grows faster. However, there are notable differences. Capital structure choices of 
EU-NMS firms are different in response to changes in the development of the banking sector, 
stock market activity, and FDI flows in the process of European integration. Firms in EU-NMS 
increase leverage as the banking sector develops. The coefficient estimate for the interaction 
term DMGDP*EU-NMS is positive and significant at 10% level. This indicates that firms in 
EU-NMS, when they have access to capital through the credit channel adjust their financing 
preferences accordingly and increase debt capital. This is also due to the willingness of 
Continental European banks’ to lend to NMS. The coefficient estimate for stock market activity 
is negative for EU-NMS firms indicating that EU-NMS firms increase equity financing as stock 
market activity increases. This confirms the findings of Agca et al. (2007) and Beck et al. 
(2008) for emerging markets. The negative coefficient estimate of the interaction term 
FFGDP*EU-NMS indicates that EU-NMS firms increase equity financing as FDI flows 
increase. This finding is important as it indicates a second route for equity market integration 
in Europe that has impact on firm corporate financing choices. FDI is the most important source 
of capital for transition economies. To our knowledge we are the first authors to report that for 
firms making corporate financing choices equity market integration can take place through FDI 
flows and European integration is a good example for that. We show that the EU-NMS firms 
access to equity capital through FDI and adjust their capital structures accordingly. 
 The second column of Table 9 reports coefficient estimates for debt maturity (CLTL) 
estimations. Third and fourth columns of the table have additional information on the maturity 
structures as revealed by the ratios of long term and short term debt to total assets respectively. 
The coefficient estimate for entry to EU is insignificant, while the coefficient estimate for 
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EVEMU is positive and significant. When firms adopt the Euro, both long term debt and short 
term debt to total assets increases as can be seen from results reported for Models 3 and 4. 
When the firms reside in countries, which join the EMU, the ratio of long term debt to total 
assets increases by 1% while the ratio of short term debt to total assets increases by 1.4%. This 
is consistent with the previous discussions that joining the EU strengthens the equity channel 
through equity market integration and has no impact on the credit market channel. The credit 
market channel for firm level financing is used mainly when the firms reside in countries, which 
adopt the Euro. 
 We observe that none of the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms with EU-NMS 
are significant except for SMTO*EUNMS while all interaction terms with EU-15 are 
significant in Model 2. This indicates the impact of the European integration process on debt 
maturities is mainly observed in EU-15 firms, which confirms our key findings that joining the 
Euro enables the firms to use the credit channel for financing and making debt maturities 
longer. In the EU-15 group all countries have joined the EMU apart from UK, Denmark and 
Sweden. Therefore this is a strong indication that joining the EMU opens up the credit channel 
for firms’ debt financing opportunities.  
 In conclusion, we would like to note that Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that firms that 
operate in less financially developed systems compared to their mature counterparts increase 
their debt financing as it becomes available. European integration has made financing available 
for firms in EU-NMS both through the equity and the credit channels. EU-15 firms already had 
access to both debt and equity capital due to their well-developed financial systems. In this 
process they could extend the maturities of their financing as a result of not only changes in 
credit markets, such as the expansion in banking sector and lowering interest rates but also the 
improvements in equity channels. For example, the expansion of stock market activities as well 
as increase in FDI flows helped these firms shift debt structures from short term to long term. 
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6.3. Measuring leverage with interest bearing debt ratios 
 In all previous estimations we included trade credit in our measure of leverage, apart 
from interest bearing debt, as these financing options are important for firms in EU-NMS.“In 
countries or specific classes of firms, which use trade credit as a means of financing, accounts 
payables should be included in measures of leverage” (Rajan and Zingales, 1995, p.1428, 
footnote 11). There is vast evidence for the importance of non-debt items in external 
financing of especially small and constrained companies. For example, Petersen and Rajan 
(1997) show the importance of trade credit as a means for access to financing for small 
companies especially when the credit from financial institutions is scarce. Beck et al. (2008) 
present evidence that small firms use less bank finance. Credit constrained firms substitute 
trade credit for institutional financing. Kayhan and Titman (2007) further suggest that 
“indeed, credit rating agencies state that traditional measures focusing on long-term debt have 
lost much of their significance and that non-interest bearing liabilities like pension 
obligations should be considered as being similar to debt in many respects."31 Accordingly, in 
our baseline estimations we used a broad measure of book leverage32, which includes non-
interest bearing items, similar to Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) along with others 
mentioned above. 
 In order to check the robustness of our findings we report results using alternative measures 
of leverage and debt maturity, which include only interest bearing debt both in calculating the 
ratio of total debt to total assets (to measure leverage) and while calculating our three measures 
                                                 
31See page 10, footnote 22 in Kayhan andTitman (2007). 
32Rajan and Zingales (1995) discuss that book measures of leverage and market measures of 
leverage yield similar results. 
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of debt maturity (e.g., Brav, 2009; Frank and Goyal, 2008).Table 10 presents the results with 
interest bearing debt for our baseline regressions of equation 1.33 We report in Panel A the 
results with the EU dummy alone, in Panel B with both EU and EVEMU variables and in Panel 
C with both EU and EVEMU variables and the controls for financial and economic indicators 
of European integration. Results are robust both with regards to capital structure and with 
regards to debt maturity. Firms increase equity when the country they reside joins the EU and 
increase interest bearing debt when it adopts the Euro. With respect to the impact of economic 
and financial indicators, we find that firms increase interest-bearing leverage as banking sector 
expands and as FDI flows increase. 
 
7. Further analysis 
7.1. Small firms  
 Firm size is an essential factor for access to financing (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
Capital structure theories also elaborate how large firms have better access to debt capital. 
According to static trade-off theory, large firms, who are more diversified, have lower 
bankruptcy risk and for that reason have relatively more debt (e.g., Bradley et al., 1984; Myers, 
1984; Frank and Goyal, 2008). Similarly, agency theory argues that large firms experience 
lower agency costs of debt due to their relatively higher asset tangibility and hence have higher 
debt (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Frank and Goyal, 2008). In the meantime adverse 
selection costs, as discussed in pecking order theory, would be lower for large firms but due to 
their relatively higher asset tangibility they would still issue debt. In conclusion, capital 
                                                 
33We present results using the EVEMU indicator. Results using the EMU dummy are 
qualitatively the same and can be made available by authors upon request. 
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structure theories predict that in comparison to small firms, large firms would have relatively 
lower cost of borrowing and would be able to issue more debt. Our descriptive statistics confirm 
this.  
 There is a well established body of empirical literature on the advantages of large firms in 
accessing external financing (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Beck et al., 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2008). Small 
firms’ access to external financing would be subject to the level of development of the financial 
system (e.g., Beck et al., 2008). Firms in more developed financial systems would have better 
access to capital. In this regard, the benefits of European integration should be more 
pronounced for small firms that will gain access to external capital in this process. Firm size 
also matters for term maturities. Large firms are subject to lower monitoring costs and have 
higher fixed assets, to issue secured and long-term debt, and thus are “inframarginal” borrowers 
(e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Large firms can borrow 
even if the banking system is undeveloped, whereas small firms’ borrowing is dependent on 
the size of the banking sector.  
 We examine whether joining the EU and EMU offers better access to finance for small firms 
and try to understand if they have actually benefited more from European integration. We 
would like to know if small firms could raise equity and debt capital or extend their maturity 
structures as the country they reside enters the EU and EMU. In our sample small firms’ size 
are similar in different country groups; the average size of small firms in EU-NMS is 10 million 
Euros while that in EU-15 is 12 million Euros (Table 2 panel C). 
 Table 11 presents our results for small firms. We rank firms according to their total assets 
measured in millions of Euros in EU-NMS and EU-15 samples separately. Each subsample is 
then split into quartiles and firms that belong to the bottom 25th percentile are defined as small 
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firms. 34 We report coefficient estimates for leverage in Model 1. The coefficient estimate for 
EU is negative and significant indicating that firms increase equity in their financing when the 
country they reside joins the EU. The coefficient estimate for EMU is insignificant. Small firms 
do not increase debt ratios when the Euro is adopted. This finding indicates that small firms do 
not benefit from the country’s membership to the EMU through the credit market channel. In 
addition, we also find that the coefficient estimate for interest rates is positive for small firms 
in EU-15 indicating that they do not benefit from the lower interest rates by increasing their 
debt financing. Note that interest rates declined in the process of EU accession especially in 
the EU-NMS. So, one could expect small firms in EU-NMS would benefit from that 
development. Our results reveal that the coefficient estimate for interest rates in EU-NMS is 
insignificant indicating that small firms could not benefit from reduced interest rates by 
increasing debt in their capital structures. Another notable finding is that small firms in EU-15 
use the equity channel mainly through the FDI flows and increase equity financing as FDI 
flows increase. Small firms in EU-NMS have responded to changes in FDI flows, by increasing 
their leverage, while they neither increase debt capital in response to the expansion of the 
banking sector, nor do they increase equity financing in response to increase in the stock market 
activity. Our results contribute to Beck et al. (2008) by showing that small firms in Europe only 
benefit from the equity market channel mainly via the FDI flows that accelerated during the 
European integration process.  
 Model 2 of Table 11 reports results for debt maturities. The coefficient estimates for both 
EU and EMU are insignificant showing that small firms do not change their debt maturity 
                                                 
34
 For non-Euro countries the firm-year observations are converted to Euros on a yearly basis 
with the Reuters exchange rates collected from Datastream. Quartiles are by firm-year 
observations. 
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structures when the country they reside, enters the EU and the EMU.   The coefficient estimates 
for the interaction terms with FDI flows indicate that small firms in EU-15 increase their debt 
maturities when FDI flows increase while the interaction term with economic growth shows 
that when growth rates in the country increase small firms reduce their debt maturities. 
Combined with the earlier capital structure results, we show that small firms cannot benefit 
from declining interest rates and the expansion of banking sector either in their leverage or in 
their debt maturity choices. When supply side issues come in to play, banks’ preference to lend 
to large firms that are deemed less risky, might still prevail. This confirms the view of 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) that large firms are “inframarginal borrowers”, at the 
same time offering some evidence that small firms still experience access to external capital 
problems despite development of the financial sector in Europe. Equity market channel via FDI 
flows is the predominant source of external capital for small firms in EU-15. For small firms 
in EU-NMS we observe that none of the financial and economic changes taking place during 
the European integration process have an effect on debt maturities.  
7.2. Non-survivor firms 
 In this section, we are looking into the effect of joining the EU and EMU on the financing 
decisions of non-surviving firms. Non-surviving firms in our sample are firms who were either 
(i) liquidated, (ii) bankrupt or (iii) no longer files with SEC. We are investigating this with the 
view to making recommendations to European firms in terms of their survival strategies with 
respect to corporate financing choices. To our knowledge this has not been examined before.  
 Table 12, presents the results for non-survivor firms in EU-15 and EU-NMS.35 Model 1 
reports the coefficient estimates for leverage. Similar to the results reported in Tables 4-6 for 
all firms, non survivors also increase equity financing when the country they reside joins the 
                                                 
35
 Approximately one third of the non-survivor sample observations are from small firms.  
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EU and they increase debt financing when it joins the EMU. The coefficient estimate for 
EVEMU is positive and significant in Models 3-4 indicating that adopting Euro results in 
significantly higher borrowing. We know from our descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 
that the non-survivors have already had higher levels of debt in their capital structures 
compared to survivors and yet they increase it even further when the country they reside in 
adopts the Euro.  
 Non-survivor firms fail to benefit from equity market integration. The coefficient estimates 
for stock market activity and FDI flows are both insignificant. The most interesting result for 
non survivors in EU-NMS is the response they give to higher growth rates in the economy by 
increasing leverage. Unlike successful firms that finance growth by equity, non-survivors 
finance growth by debt.  Additional information from model 4 indicates that they finance 
growth in fact by increasing short term debt. No doubt this corporate financing strategy of 
excessive and especially short term leverage increases their fragility. 
 
    8. Conclusions 
 In this paper we have conducted a firm level analysis of the importance of the supply of 
capital on corporate financing choices. The European integration process provides an excellent 
background as the firms in Europe faced two exogenous events, besides the usual developments 
in financial integration that improved access to capital. The first phase of European integration 
is the countries’ accession to the EU, which facilitates equity market integration and the second 
phase is the adoption of the Euro, which improves the credit channel. Using a very large cross-
country firm level panel data that covers firms in all European countries, we show that firms 
increase equity financing when the country they reside joins the EU and increase debt financing 
and both short and long-term borrowing when it adopts the Euro. The supply of capital matters 
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for firms financing choices irrespective of whether the financial system is bank based or market 
based. 
 In this process, a complex set of changes took place in financial and economic environments 
of European firms that affected corporations’ access to various sources of financing. We 
control for those, and we show that the impact of the EU and the Euro on corporate financing 
choices is additional to these developments. EU-15 countries have more developed financial 
systems while most EU-NMS are at different stages of financial development. When we control 
for the moderating effects of country of domicile we confirm the additional impact of 
membership to the EU and the adoption of the Euro on firms’ capital structure and debt maturity 
choices. Our results are also robust to the inclusion of controls of financial globalisation 
indicators and to the use of different measures of leverage. 
 A unique feature of this paper is the introduction of FDI as an important component of the 
integration in Europe through the equity channel. We show at the firm level that integration 
with respect to accessing equity capital, can also be obtained through FDI which is in addition 
to what has been previously found at the market level via stock markets (e.g., Bekaert et al., 
2013), ADR’s (e.g., Foerster and Karolyi, 1999, 2000) and international IPO’s (e.g., Doidge et 
al., 2012). We show that small firms are the beneficiaries of the European integration process 
via the equity channel and especially through FDI flows. Finally we show that firms that could 
not survive the European integration process are the ones that started the process with higher 
levels of debt and shifted to excessive short term debt to finance higher growth rates in the 
economy while their peers were relying on equity financing.  
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Appendix A 
Average firm-year observations 
 
year N(tlta) N(cltl) N(ltdta) N(clta) 
1996 3.554 3.554 3.554 3.554 
1997 3.595 3.595 3.595 3.595 
1998 3.924 3.924 3.924 3.924 
1999 4.313 4.313 4.313 4.313 
2000 4.392 4.392 4.392 4.392 
2001 4.355 4.355 4.355 4.355 
2002 4.247 4.247 4.247 4.247 
2003 4.281 4.281 4.281 4.281 
2004 4.509 4.509 4.509 4.509 
2005 4.663 4.663 4.663 4.663 
2006 4.615 4.615 4.615 4.615 
2007 4.417 4.417 4.417 4.417 
2008 4.038 4.038 4.038 4.038 
2009 2.976 2.976 2.976 2.976 
total 57.879 57.879 57.879 57.879 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45 
 
Appendix B 
Stylised Facts about financial and Economic indicators of the European Integration 
Process 
We report stylised facts about the financial and economic indicators of European integration 
process in this Appendix. We compare EU-NMS to EU-15 countries, and before and after the 
accession to EMU. We list our comments below.  First, interest rates are generally higher in 
EU-NMS10% compared to 6% in EU-15 countries during our sample period. The lowest and 
highest interest rates are observed in Cyprus 7.5% and Hungary 13.5%, respectively, among 
the EU-NMS and in Netherlands 4.2% and Greece 9.5% among the EU-15 countries. Secondly, 
after joining EMU, interest rates declined from 11% to 5.5% for EU-NMS and from 7% to 
5.5% in EU-15, reflecting the countries’ preparation to accede to EMU and abide by the 
Maastricht Criteria, which sets ceiling rates for inflation, budget deficits, government debt, and 
long-term interest rates in addition to joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism. The average GDP 
growth rate is 5% in EU-NMS and 3% in EU-15 countries. The highest growth rates are 
experienced in Estonia and Latvia (6.7%) in EU-NMS and in Ireland (6.5%) in EU-15 
countries. In the post-EMU period, real GDP growth rates are not significantly higher than in 
pre-EMU period in either group of countries. This could be due to the global financial crisis. 
Deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio is 30% for EU-NMS and 58% for the EU-15 
countries.36 Cyprus and Luxembourg had the most established financial sectors in accession 
                                                 
36
 We exclude Luxembourg, which constitutes an outlier, in our calculations for means. 
Luxemburg is one of the smallest countries in Europe with a population of about half a 
million and an area of less than 1000 square miles. The banking sector in Luxemburg is one 
of the most developed in Europe and thus the ratio of deposit money to GDP is 12 times. 
Compared to other European countries with highly developed financial systems such as UK 
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countries and EU-15 countries, respectively. In post-EMU the size of the financial sector 
remains stable in EU-NMS, and increases from 44% to 53% of GDP in EU-15.  
 The stock markets are a lot more developed in EU-15 compared to EU-NMS. The stock 
market turnover rate is 40%, on average, for EU-NMS and 89%, on average, for the EU-15 
countries. This is a significant difference. Hungary and Spain have the highest stock market 
activity respectively in EU-NMS and EU-15 countries. Stock market turnover decreases during 
accession to EMU in EU-NMS and increases in EU-15 countries. For the EU-NMS, the average 
ratio of FDI to GDP is 6.1% while it is 12.7% for the EU-15 countries. FDI increases in EU-
NMS from 5% to 7% in post-EMU period, while FDI flows remain higher in EU15. 
 In conclusion, the descriptive statistics have revealed the following developments in the 
financial and economic landscape of the European companies. Interest rates have declined, real 
economic growth has decreased possibly as a result of the global financial crisis and the size 
of the banking sector expanded. We observe a decrease in the stock market activity of EU-
NMS while stock market activity increases in EU-15 countries.37 The inward FDI flows to EU-
NMS increased in post-EMU periods especially in the EU-15 countries. In Europe, equity 
                                                 
and Germany who have a ratio of 1.5 and 0.4 respectively, this number is considered to be an 
outlier. 
37
 In Europe, larger economies’ stock market capitalizations went up more than 13 times and 
the proportion of investments financed through equity increased more than 16 times during 
the two decades since 1980 (Rajan and Zingales 2003). For smaller countries, this has not 
been the case. Many of these stock markets were created and initially used for mass 
privatizations (Claessenset al. 2001). Subsequently, they levelled off and a more developed 
financial system similar to that of the larger economies of Europe emerged as the countries 
joined the EU. 
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capital becomes more readily available through foreign partners rather than through stock 
exchanges for EU-NMS, while EU-15 countries benefit from both routes of equity capital 
flows. 
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Appendix C 
Correlation Matrix 
 
  tlta   cltl ltdta clta nfata size prof emu evemu eu int grrgdp dmgdp smto ffgdp crisis 
tlta   1.00 
               
cltl -0.25 1.00 
              
ltdta 0.46 -0.71 1.00 
             
clta 0.67 0.49 -0.18 1.00 
            
nfata 0.06 -0.43 0.35 -0.25 1.00 
           
size 0.29 -0.40 0.33 -0.04 0.24 1.00 
          
prof 0.10 -0.10 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.27 1.00 
         
emu 0.16 -0.12 0.07 0.05 -0.13 0.19 0.06 1.00 
        
evemu 0.19 -0.17 0.07 0.04 -0.13 0.21 0.07 0.93 1.00 
       
eu -0.07 -0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.13 0.03 -0.03 0.15 0.16 1.00 
      
int -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.07 -0.44 1.00 
     
grrgdp -0.12 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.14 -0.06 0.05 -0.25 -0.30 -0.13 -0.04 1.00 
    
dmgdp 0.10 0.05 0.00 -0.06 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.24 -0.27 0.10 -0.24 0.11 1.00 
   
smto 0.04 -0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.18 0.05 -0.05 0.26 0.31 0.20 -0.03 -0.36 -0.10 1.00 
  
ffgdp -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.15 0.38 -0.10 1.00 
 
crisis 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.07 -0.23 -0.06 0.20 -0.03 1.00 
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Figure 1 
FDI Inflows  
This figure illustrates on average the annual inward foreign direct investment flows in USD in billions to EU-NMSs and EU-
15over the period 1996-2009. Source: UNCTAD 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
FDI Inflows as percentage of GDP 
This figure illustrates on average the inward foreign direct investment flows as percentage of GDP to EU-NMSs and EU-15 
over the period 1996-2009. Source: UNCTAD 
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Table 1 
Leverage, Debt Maturities, and firm level characteristics of European firms   
Panel A: Firms in EU-NMS 
  
Number of 
Observations TLTA CLTL LTDTA CLTA NFATA Size Profitability 
Cyprus 118 0.500 0.668 0.114 0.347 0.440 181 0.052 
  0.221 0.259 0.118 0.218 0.281 225 0.084 
Czech Republic 203 0.439 0.623 0.086 0.279 0.610 1285 0.064 
  0.160 0.259 0.092 0.167 0.185 2459 0.084 
Estonia 146 0.403 0.701 0.138 0.258 0.465 137 0.110 
  0.206 0.260 0.155 0.157 0.257 297 0.106 
Hungary 252 0.360 0.710 0.081 0.242 0.481 770 0.078 
  0.149 0.238 0.100 0.121 0.193 1865 0.074 
Latvia 201 0.302 0.645 0.088 0.179 0.473 99 0.044 
  0.201 0.255 0.139 0.141 0.201 188 0.110 
Lithuania 224 0.433 0.577 0.146 0.248 0.606 206 0.057 
  0.198 0.245 0.137 0.154 0.245 276 0.087 
Poland 1952 0.484 0.760 0.069 0.364 0.346 251 0.068 
  0.196 0.198 0.112 0.181 0.203 983 0.193 
Slovakia 63 0.508 0.712 0.094 0.367 0.419 479 0.073 
  0.184 0.201 0.095 0.181 0.233 617 0.120 
Slovenia 204 0.442 0.620 0.113 0.280 0.505 525 0.044 
    0.189 0.158 0.089 0.142 0.151 488 0.043 
EU-NMS 3363 0.453 0.714 0.085 0.32 0.416 353 0.066 
    0.199 0.224 0.117 0.18 0.227 1140 0.158 
 Panel B:Firms in EU-15 
  
Number of 
Observations TLTA CLTL LTDTA CLTA NFATA Size Profitability 
Austria 1062 0.586 0.556 0.126 0.324 0.320 937 0.038 
  0.2 0.205 0.123 0.163 0.189 2137 0.097 
Belgium 1300 0.571 0.639 0.144 0.354 0.296 1488 0.050 
  0.198 0.214 0.137 0.166 0.213 5073 0.132 
Denmark 1578 0.515 0.655 0.144 0.329 0.323 721 0.031 
  0.195 0.219 0.134 0.163 0.210 2951 0.173 
Finland 1576 0.530 0.632 0.155 0.323 0.288 1190 0.064 
  0.164 0.206 0.128 0.138 0.203 3392 0.125 
France 7948 0.598 0.698 0.130 0.410 0.186 2790 0.059 
  0.187 0.205 0.132 0.175 0.173 11651 0.131 
Germany 8118 0.567 0.568 0.102 0.309 0.231 2560 0.013 
  0.220 0.244 0.126 0.173 0.191 14180 0.247 
Greece 1347 0.545 0.668 0.143 0.356 0.373 655 0.073 
  0.166 0.234 0.144 0.162 0.210 1577 0.088 
Ireland 828 0.460 0.658 0.154 0.267 0.333 760 -0.001 
  0.250 0.270 0.171 0.165 0.275 2044 0.235 
Italy 2810 0.603 0.648 0.129 0.389 0.258 3262 0.041 
  0.189 0.186 0.119 0.174 0.201 12403 0.102 
Luxembourg 303 0.520 0.552 0.183 0.266 0.380 4244 0.056 
  0.212 0.237 0.159 0.140 0.238 13063 0.110 
Netherlands 2077 0.581 0.677 0.132 0.383 0.259 2443 0.059 
  0.192 0.206 0.129 0.164 0.194 7284 0.213 
Portugal 626 0.656 0.612 0.196 0.398 0.371 1709 0.044 
  0.173 0.207 0.139 0.166 0.203 3979 0.066 
Spain 1620 0.579 0.603 0.152 0.341 0.360 3741 0.067 
  0.183 0.230 0.143 0.170 0.225 10975 0.075 
Sweden 3988 0.507 0.679 0.125 0.327 0.201 757 -0.032 
  0.211 0.697 0.146 0.176 0.207 2823 0.307 
UK 19335 0.478 0.729 0.101 0.330 0.282 1209 -0.022 
    0.233 0.249 0.136 0.195 0.259 8325 0.371 
EU-15  54516 0.535 0.671 0.119 0.344 0.262 1824 0.014 
    0.218 0.24 0.135 0.261 0.227 9579 0.272 
TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; CLTL is the ratio of current liabilities to total liabilities; LTDTA is the ratio 
of long-term debt to total assets; CLTA is the ratio of current liabilities to total assets; NFATA is the ratio of net fixed assets to 
total assets; Profitability is the ROA and Size is the total assets in million Euros. The first row for each country denotes the 
mean values and the second row denotes the standard deviations for firm observations over the research period 1996-2009.  
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Table 2  
Leverage and Debt Maturity Comparisons in EU-15 and EU-NMS Firms     
Panel A: Firms in EU-NMS and EU15 Countries  
    
  EU-NMS EU15 Difference     
TLTA 0.453 0.535 21.288*** 
    
CLTL 0.714 0.671 -9.970*** 
    
NFATA 0.416 0.26 -38.458*** 
    
Size 353 1824 8.898***     
Profitability 0.066 0.014 -10.927*** 
    
    
    
Panel B: Firms in Pre- and Post-EMU periods       
 EU-NMS EU-15 
 Pre-EMU Post-EMU Difference   Pre-EMU Post-EMU Difference 
TLTA 0.44 0.52 2.932*** 
 
0.507 0.572 8.639*** 
CLTL 0.66 0.625 -1.526* 
 
0.615 0.638 -0.697*** 
NFATA 0.47 0.433 -1.414*  0.299 0.241 -18.928*** 
Size 292 648 6.217***  1664 2611 5.842*** 
Profitability 0.071 0.035 -3.153***  0.071 0.036 -14.04*** 
    
    
Panel C: Small Firms vs. Large Firms       
 EU-NMS EU15 
 Small Large Difference  Small Large Difference 
TLTA 0.441 0.46 2.279** 
 
0.44 0.627 74.157*** 
CLTL 0.77 0.563 -17.182*** 
 
0.791 0.542 -98.242*** 
NFATA 0.346 0.559 16.976*** 
 
0.175 0.326 58.433*** 
Size 10 1912 22.056*** 
 
12 6664 43.587*** 
Profitability 0.058 0.064 0.457  -0.11 0.072 46.505*** 
     
 
  
Panel D: Non-survivor Firms vs. Survivor Firms      
 EU-NMS EU15 
 Non-Survivor Survivor Difference  Non-Survivor Survivor Difference 
TLTA 0.49 0.457 -1.845**  0.564 0.532 -7.885*** 
CLTL 0.662 0.713 2.512***  0.681 0.665 -3.604*** 
NFATA 0.52 0.409 -5.297***  0.273 0.247 -6.761*** 
Size 447 370 -0.708  284 2309 13.83*** 
Profitability 0.054 0.064 -1.334   -0.106 -0.029 3.837*** 
The mean values for each variable over the research period 1996-2009 are presented in the rows for each panel. The difference column in the means statistics is t-test of equality of 
means. TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; CLTL is the ratio of current liabilities to total liabilities; NFATA is the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets; Size is the total 
assets in million Euros and Profitability is the return on assets ratio. Small firms are the firms that ranked at the bottom 25% and large firms are the firms that ranked at the top 25% 
in each panel. Non-survivor firms are inactive firms except for M&As. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level correspondingly. 
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Table 3  
Financial and Economic Determinants of Capital Structures and Debt Maturities in Europe 
Panel A: New member states    
Countries 
INT 
 
GRRGDP 
 
DMGDP 
 
SMTO 
 
FFGDP 
 
EU 
Accession 
Date 
EMU 
Accession 
Date 
Cyprus 0.075 0.036 1.729 0.235 0.095 2004 2008 
Czech Republic 0.080 0.032 0.189 0.575 0.058 2004  
Estonia 0.085 0.067 0.161 0.377 0.087 2004 2011 
Hungary 0.135 0.036 0.078 0.778 0.119 2004  
Latvia 0.115 0.067 0.295 0.136 0.048 2004  
Lithuania 0.097 0.062 0.069 0.202 0.039 2004  
Poland 0.133 0.047 0.064 0.470 0.037 2004  
Slovakia 0.114 0.053 0.075 0.629 0.055 2004 2009 
Slovenia 0.120 0.043 0.112 0.182 0.019 2004 2007 
Panel B: EU-15    
Countries 
INT 
 
GRRGDP 
 
DMGDP 
 
SMTO 
 
FFGDP 
 
EU 
Accession 
Date 
EMU 
Accession 
Date 
Austria 0.049 0.024 0.519 0.412 0.027 1995 1999 
Belgium 0.075 0.022 0.695 0.461 0.135 1957 1999 
Denmark 0.068 0.019 0.501 0.740 0.042 1973  
Finland 0.045 0.036 0.275 0.997 0.033 1995 1999 
France 0.043 0.021 0.424 0.881 0.027 1957 1999 
Germany 0.093 0.015 0.392 1.386 0.020 1957 1999 
Greece 0.095 0.038 0.167 0.594 0.008 1981 2001 
Ireland 0.052 0.065 2.099 0.595 0.070 1973 1999 
Italy 0.071 0.013 0.094 1.253 0.011 1957 1999 
Luxembourg 0.044 0.046 12.86 0.017 1.313 1957 1999 
Netherlands 0.042 0.028 0.624 1.288 0.066 1957 1999 
Portugal 0.062 0.022 0.265 0.679 0.027 1986 1999 
Spain 0.061 0.035 0.161 1.741 0.033 1986 1999 
Sweden 0.051 0.028 0.360 1.076 0.062 1995  
UK 0.052 0.028 1.487 1.131 0.042 1973  
Panel C: EU-NMS vs. EU15   
 EU-NMS EU15 Difference      
INT 0.101 0.060 -10.764***      
GRRGDP 0.049 0.029 -6.669***      
DMGDP 0.307 0.575 3.093***      
SMTO 0.404 0.885 8.296***      
FFGDP 0.061 0.127 1.242*      
Panel D: EU-NMS vs. EU15 in Pre- and Post-EMU Periods   
 EU-NMS  EU15  
 Pre-EMU Post-EMU Difference  Pre-EMU Post-EMU Difference  
INT 0.110 0.055 -2.022*  0.076 0.055 -2.835***  
GRRGDP 0.039 0.044 1.000  0.037 0.028 -2.123**  
DMGDP 1.055 1.044 -0.458  0.441 0.536 0.711  
SMTO 0.442 0.053 -1.355  0.709 0.908 1.853**  
FFGDP 0.051 0.076 0.444   0.097 0.163 1.209   
The figures are annual averages for the period 1996-2009. INT is the lending interest rates, GRRGDP is the growth rate of real 
GDP, DMGDP  is the ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP, SMTO is stock market turnover calculated as the ratio of 
total value of shares traded during the period to the average market capitalization for the period. FFGDP  is the ratio of inward 
FDI flows to GDP. The difference column in the means statistics is t-test of equality of means and is a matched paired t-test 
of equality of means for pre- and post-EMU comparisons. We exclude Luxembourg from Deposit money bank assets to GDP 
ratio in our calculations for means as it is an outlier.*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
correspondingly. 
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Table 4 
European Integration and Capital Structures  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
EU -0.028** -0.028** -0.027** -0.045*** -0.042*** 
 
0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 
EMU 
 
0.011*** 
 
0.007* 
 
  
0.003 
 
0.004 
 
EVEMU 
  
0.022*** 
 
0.016*** 
   
0.005 
 
0.005 
INT 
   
-0.327*** -0.293*** 
    
0.066 0.066 
GRRGDP 
   
-0.371*** -0.365*** 
    
0.060 0.060 
DMGDP 
   
0.001 0.002 
    
0.002 0.002 
SMTO 
   
0.007** 0.007* 
    
0.003 0.003 
FFGDP 
   
-0.001 -0.001 
    
0.005 0.005 
NFATA 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
 
0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
SIZE 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
PROF -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
 
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 
CRISIS 
   
-0.001 -0.001 
    
0.003 0.003 
Constant 0.459*** 0.459*** 0.455*** 0.505*** 0.496*** 
 
0.015 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.018 
Number of Observations 49497 49497 49493 45185 45181 
Adj. R-Squared 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.752 0.752 
 
The data is gathered from the Compustat Global Industrials and Commercials database and is composed 
of the balance sheet and income statements for the companies in each country from 1996-2009. 
Dependent variable TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.EU is the EU accession dummy; 
EMU is the EMU accession dummy; EVEMU is the foreign exchange based EMU indicator; INT is 
lending rates; GRRGDP  is the growth rate of real GDP;DMGDP  is the deposit money bank assets to 
GDP ratio; STMO is the stock market turnover; FFGDP  is the ratio of FDI flows to GDP;CRISIS is the 
crisis dummy; NFATA is the net fixed assets to total assets ratio; Size is the log of total assets and 
Profitability is the ROA ratio. For each variable the first row is the beta coefficients and the second row 
is heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at firm level as in Petersen (2009). *** denotes 
significant at 1%, ** at 5%.and * at 10%. 
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Table 5 
European Integration and Debt Maturities 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
EU 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.020* 0.017 
 
0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 
EMU 
 
0.014*** 
 
0.017*** 
 
  
0.004 
 
0.004 
 
EVEMU 
  
0.004 
 
0.007 
   
0.005 
 
0.006 
INT 
   
0.318*** 0.279*** 
    
0.074 0.074 
GRRGDP 
   
0.259*** 0.269*** 
    
0.069 0.069 
DMGDP 
   
-0.007** -0.007** 
    
0.003 0.003 
SMTO 
   
-0.018*** -0.017*** 
    
0.004 0.004 
FFGDP 
   
-0.0142** -0.0135* 
    
0.007 0.007 
NFATA -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.136*** -0.136*** 
 
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
SIZE -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
PROF 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.013* 0.012* 
 
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 
CRISIS 
   
0.017*** 0.018*** 
    
0.004 0.004 
Constant 0.897*** 0.897*** 0.896*** 0.864*** 0.869*** 
 
0.016 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.019 
Number of Observations 49497 49497 49493 45185 45181 
Adj. R-Squared 0.724 0.724 0.724 0.733 0.733 
 The data is gathered from the Compustat Global Industrials and Commercials database and is 
composed of the balance sheet and income statements for the companies in each country from 1996-
2009. Dependent variable CLTL is the ratio of current liabilities to total liabilities.EU is the EU 
accession dummy; EMU is the EMU accession dummy; EVEMU is the foreign exchange based EMU 
indicator; INT is lending rates; GRRGDP  is the growth rate of real GDP; DMGDP  is the deposit money 
bank assets to GDP ratio; STMO is the stock market turnover; FFGDP  is the ratio of FDI flows to GDP; 
CRISIS is the crisis dummy; NFATA is the net fixed assets to total assets ratio; Size is the log of total 
assets and Profitability is the ROA ratio. For each variable the first row is the beta coefficients and the 
second row is heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at firm level as in Petersen (2009). 
*** denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%.and * at 10%. 
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Table 6 
European Integration and Long & Short term debt ratios  
  
            
Panel A: LTD / TA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Panel B: CL / TA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
EU -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.013* -0.012*  EU -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.021** -0.021**  
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 
 
 
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 
EMU 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.007** 
 
 
EMU 
 
0.014*** 
 
0.012*** 
 
  
0.002 
 
0.003 
 
 
  
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
EVEMU 
  
0.009** 
 
0.009**  EVEMU 
  
0.014*** 
 
0.011**    
0.004 
 
0.004 
 
   
0.004 
 
0.005 
INT 
   
-0.100** -0.094**  INT 
   
-0.050 -0.061 
    
0.043 0.043 
 
    
0.055 0.055 
GRRGDP 
   
-0.033 -0.027 
 
GRRGDP 
   
-0.074 -0.065 
    
0.044 0.044 
 
    
0.052 0.052 
DMGDP 
   
0.003* 0.004* 
 
DMGDP 
   
-0.003 -0.003 
    
0.002 0.002 
 
    
0.002 0.002 
SMTO 
   
0.001 0.001 
 
SMTO 
   
-0.003 -0.003 
    
0.002 0.002 
 
    
0.003 0.003 
FFGDP 
   
0.006 0.006 
 
FFGDP 
   
-0.010** -0.009**     
0.004 0.004 
 
    
0.004 0.004 
NFATA 0.0754*** 0.0756*** 0.0756*** 0.0907*** 0.0907***  NFATA 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.004  
0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 
 
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 
SIZE 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025***  SIZE -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012***  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
PROF -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018***  PROF -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.037***  
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 
 
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 
CRISIS 
   
0.003 0.003 
 
CRISIS 
   
0.010*** 0.010*** 
    
0.002 0.002 
 
    
0.003 0.003 
Constant -0.023** -0.023** -0.025*** -0.014 -0.016  Constant 0.411*** 0.410*** 0.408*** 0.425*** 0.425***  
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.012 
 
 
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.015 
Number of obsv. 49497 49497 49493 45185 45181 
 
Number of obsv. 49497 49497 49493 45185 45181 
Adj.R-Squared 0.695 0.695 0.695 0.700 0.700 
 
Adj.R-Squared 0.726 0.727 0.726 0.732 0.732 
The data is gathered from the Compustat Global Industrials and Commercials database and is composed of the balance sheet and income statements for the companies in each country from 1996-2009. Dependent variables 
are respectively LTDTA, the ratio of long term debt to total assets and CLTA, the ratio of current liabilities to total assets.EU is the EU accession dummy; EMU is the EMU accession dummy; EVEMU is the foreign exchange 
based EMU indicator; INT is lending rates; GRRGDP  is the growth rate of real GDP; DMGDP  is the deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio; STMO is the stock market turnover; FFGDP  is the ratio of FDI flows to GDP; 
CRISIS is the crisis dummy; NFATA is the net fixed assets to total assets ratio; Size is the log of total assets and Profitability is the ROA ratio. Panel A presents the results for LTDTA and Panel B presents the results for 
CLTA. For each variable the first row is the beta coefficients and the second row is heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at firm level as in Petersen (2009). In panel A the results for LTDTA / TA are presented 
and in panel B the results for CLTA. *** denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%.and * at 10%. 
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Table 7  
European Integration and Impact of Global Equity Flows 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
TLTA CLTL LTDTA CLTA 
EU -0.034** 0.018 -0.012* -0.014 
 
0.011 0.011 0.007 0.010 
EVEMU 0.018*** 0.009 0.011*** 0.013*** 
 
0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 
GEQY -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
INT -0.262*** 0.279*** -0.106** -0.030 
 
0.065 0.074 0.043 0.054 
GRRGDP -0.548*** 0.250*** -0.058 -0.216*** 
 
0.072 0.081 0.052 0.062 
DMGDP -0.001 -0.01*** 0.000 -0.005** 
 
0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 
SMTO 0.008** -0.018*** 0.002 -0.004 
 
0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 
FFGDP -0.004 -0.019** 0.000 -0.012*** 
 
0.005 0.008 0.003 0.005 
NFATA 0.103*** -0.134*** 0.090*** 0.007 
 
0.014 0.017 0.011 0.011 
SIZE 0.013*** -0.038*** 0.025*** -0.011*** 
 
0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 
PROF -0.063*** 0.011 -0.017*** -0.037*** 
 
0.008 0.007 0.004 0.006 
CRISIS 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.004* 0.019*** 
 
0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 
Constant 0.489*** 0.868*** -0.012 0.417*** 
 
0.018 0.019 0.012 0.015 
Number of Observations 43311 43311 43311 43311 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.756 0.737 0.705 0.738 
 
The data is gathered from the Compustat Global Industrials and Commercials database and is composed of 
the balance sheet and income statements for the companies in each country from 1996-2009. TLTA is the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets; CLTL is the ratio of current liabilities to total liabilities; LTDTA is the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets; CLTA is the ratio of current liabilities to total assets; EU is the EU 
accession dummy; EMU is the EMU accession dummy; EVEMU is the foreign exchange based EMU 
indicator; INT is lending rates; GRRGDP  is the growth rate of real GDP; DMGDP  is the deposit money 
bank assets to GDP ratio; STMO is the stock market turnover; FFGDP  is the ratio of FDI flows to GDP; 
CRISIS is the crisis dummy; NFATA is the net fixed assets to total assets ratio; Size is the log of total assets 
and Profitability is the ROA ratio. GEQY is the ratio of the stock of portfolio equity assets and liabilities 
and the stock of direct investment assets and liabilities to GDP. For each variable the first row is the beta 
coefficients and the second row is heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at firm level as in 
Petersen (2009). *** denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%.and * at 10%. 
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Table 8  
European Integration and Impact of Foreign Assets and Liabilities 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
TLTA CLTL LTDTA CLTA 
EU -0.033*** 0.018 -0.012* -0.014 
 
0.011 0.012 0.007 0.010 
EVEMU 0.017*** 0.011* 0.011*** 0.013*** 
 
0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 
IFIGDP 0.000 -0.001* -0.001* 0.000 
 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
INT -0.260*** 0.275*** -0.104** -0.029 
 
0.065 0.074 0.043 0.054 
GRRGDP -0.548*** 0.236*** -0.064 -0.220*** 
 
0.072 0.081 0.052 0.062 
DMGDP 0.001 -0.011*** 0.001 -0.005** 
 
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
SMTO 0.007** -0.017*** 0.003 -0.004 
 
0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 
FFGDP -0.001 -0.023*** 0.001 -0.012** 
 
0.005 0.008 0.003 0.005 
NFATA 0.104*** -0.135*** 0.090*** 0.007 
 
0.014 0.018 0.011 0.011 
SIZE 0.013*** -0.037*** 0.025*** -0.011*** 
 
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 
PROF -0.063*** 0.011 -0.017*** -0.037*** 
 
0.008 0.007 0.004 0.006 
CRISIS 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.004* 0.019*** 
 
0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 
Constant 0.488*** 0.870*** -0.012 0.417*** 
 
0.018 0.019 0.012 0.015 
Number of Observations 43311 43311 43311 43311 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.756 0.737 0.705 0.738 
 The data is gathered from the Compustat Global Industrials and Commercials database and is 
composed of the balance sheet and income statements for the companies in each country from 1996-
2009. TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; CLTL is the ratio of current liabilities to total 
liabilities; LTDTA is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; CLTA is the ratio of current liabilities to 
total assets; EU is the EU accession dummy; EMU is the EMU accession dummy; EVEMU is the foreign 
exchange based EMU indicator; INT is lending rates; GRRGDP  is the growth rate of real GDP; DMGDP 
is the deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio; STMO is the stock market turnover; FFGDP  is the ratio 
of FDI flows to GDP; CRISIS is the crisis dummy; NFATA is the net fixed assets to total assets ratio; 
Size is the log of total assets and Profitability is the ROA ratio. IFIGDP is the ratio of the external assets 
and liabilities to the GDP. For each variable the first row is the beta coefficients and the second row is 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at firm level as in Petersen (2009). *** denotes 
significant at 1%, ** at 5%.and * at 10%. 
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Table 9  
Corporate Financing Decisions of EU-15 and EU-NMS firms during European Integration 
Panel A Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  
TLTA CLTL LTDTA CLTA 
EU -0.035*** 0.000 -0.007 -0.027*** 
 
0.012 0.013 0.007 0.010 
EVEMU 0.015** 0.016** 0.007* 0.014*** 
 
0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 
INT*EU15 -0.317*** 0.582*** -0.156** 0.102 
 
0.100 0.117 0.073 0.085 
GRRGDP*EU15 -0.329*** 0.347*** -0.015 -0.002 
 
0.069 0.078 0.052 0.060 
DMGDP*EU15 0.002 -0.008** 0.004* -0.003 
 
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
SMTO*EU15 0.007* -0.012*** 0.000 -0.001 
 
0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 
FFGDP*EU15 0.002 -0.022*** 0.008* -0.011** 
 
0.005 0.008 0.005 0.005 
NFATA*EU15 0.107*** -0.133*** 0.093*** 0.009 
 
0.015 0.018 0.012 0.011 
SIZE*EU15 0.014*** -0.039*** 0.025*** -0.011*** 
 
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 
PROF*EU15 -0.066*** 0.011 -0.019*** -0.039*** 
 
0.008 0.007 0.004 0.006 
INT*EUNMS -0.240*** 0.033 -0.069 -0.175** 
  0.093 0.082 0.049 0.070 
GRRGDP*EUNMS -0.364*** 0.070 -0.083 -0.176* 
  0.120 0.144 0.083 0.100 
DMGDP*EUNMS 0.033* -0.017 0.014 0.015 
  0.022 0.034 0.022 0.023 
SMTO*EUNMS -0.0501** -0.0414* 0.009 -0.0531*** 
  0.026 0.024 0.014 0.019 
FFGDP*EUNMS -0.0442* 0.032 -0.018 -0.022 
  0.024 0.033 0.022 0.024 
NFATA*EUNMS 0.013 -0.185*** 0.066 -0.065 
  0.058 0.062 0.049 0.045 
SIZE*EUNMS -0.030 0.016 0.001 -0.013 
  0.047 0.019 0.013 0.033 
PROF*EUNMS -0.005 -0.0336*** 0.0162*** -0.0202*** 
  0.009 0.009 0.006 0.008 
CRISIS 0.001 0.0147*** 0.00413* 0.00942*** 
 
0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 
Constant 0.492*** 0.861*** -0.017 0.418*** 
 
0.018 0.020 0.012 0.015 
Number of Observations 45181 45181 45181 45181 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.708 0.686 0.647 0.684 
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Panel B 
INT 0.569 0.000*** 0.325 0.011** 
GRRGDP 0.801 0.091* 0.487 0.136 
DMGDP 0.156 0.778 0.638 0.442 
SMTO 0.027** 0.237 0.509 0.006*** 
FFGDP 0.0609* 0.116 0.230 0.650 
NFATA 0.114 0.419 0.585 0.112 
SIZE 0.038** 0.598 0.125 0.261 
PROF 0.448 0.816 0.139 0.432 
 
The data is gathered from the Compustat Global Industrials and Commercials database and is 
composed of the balance sheet and income statements for the companies in each country from 1996-
2009. TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; CLTL is the ratio of current liabilities to 
total liabilities; LTDTA is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; CLTA is the ratio of current 
liabilities to total assets; INT is lending rates; GRRGDP  is the growth rate of real GDP;DMGDP  is 
the deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio; STMO is the stock market turnover; EU is the EU 
accession dummy; EVEMU is the foreign exchange based EMU indicator; FFGDP  is the ratio of 
FDI flows to GDP;CRISIS is the crisis dummy; NFATA is the net fixed assets to total assets ratio; 
Size is the log of total assets and Profitability is the ROA ratio. All firm specific and macro variables 
except for dummies are interacted with EU15 (EUNMS) dummy, which takes on value one (zero) 
if it is an EU-15 country and zero (one) otherwise. In panel B we present p-values for the F-test of 
equality of coefficients X(EU15)=X(EUNMS), where X represents the firm and macro level 
variables.  For each variable, the first row is the beta coefficients and the second row is 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at firm level as in Petersen (2009). *** 
denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%.and * at 10%. 
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Table 10 
Capital Structures and Debt Maturities with Interest-bearing Leverage and Debt Maturity Ratios 
Panel A TDTA SDTD LTDTA SDTA 
EU -0.046*** -0.048** -0.006 -0.006 
 
0.012 0.020 0.006 0.008 
NFATA 0.106*** -0.117*** 0.075*** 0.040*** 
 
0.013 0.025 0.011 0.007 
SIZE 0.0351*** -0.0459*** 0.026*** 0.009*** 
 
0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 
PROF -0.069*** -0.030** -0.020*** -0.017*** 
 
0.009 0.014 0.003 0.003 
Constant 0.063*** 0.793*** -0.023** 0.034*** 
 
0.015 0.028 0.010 0.009 
Number of Observations 44582 42221 49497 50268 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.704 0.575 0.695 0.565 
Panel B TDTA SDTD LTDTA SDTA 
EU -0.045*** -0.048** -0.006 -0.006 
 
0.012 0.020 0.006 0.008 
EVEMU 0.017*** -0.005 0.009** 0.008*** 
 
0.004 0.009 0.004 0.003 
NFATA 0.107*** -0.117*** 0.076*** 0.040*** 
 
0.013 0.025 0.011 0.007 
SIZE 0.034*** -0.046*** 0.026*** 0.008*** 
 
0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 
PROF -0.068*** -0.031** -0.019*** -0.016*** 
 
0.008 0.014 0.003 0.003 
Constant 0.060*** 0.794*** -0.025*** 0.032*** 
 
0.015 0.028 0.010 0.009 
Number of Observations 44578 42218 49493 50264 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.704 0.575 0.695 0.565 
Panel C TDTA SDTD LTDTA SDTA 
EU -0.049*** -0.031 -0.012* -0.009 
 
0.012 0.021 0.007 0.008 
EVEMU 0.021*** -0.002 0.009** 0.009*** 
 
0.005 0.010 0.004 0.003 
INT -0.025 0.333** -0.094** 0.021 
 
0.067 0.139 0.043 0.043 
GRRGDP 0.025 0.267** -0.027 0.116*** 
 
0.059 0.127 0.044 0.038 
DMGDP 0.005* -0.002 0.004* -0.001 
 
0.003 0.004 0.002 0.001 
SMTO -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.004** 
 
0.003 0.007 0.002 0.002 
FFGDP 0.013*** 0.013 0.006 0.003 
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0.004 0.009 0.004 0.002 
NFATA 0.122*** -0.137*** 0.091*** 0.039*** 
 
0.014 0.027 0.011 0.007 
SIZE 0.033*** -0.043*** 0.025*** 0.009*** 
 
0.002 0.004 0.002 0.001 
PROF -0.063*** -0.038** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 
0.009 0.015 0.004 0.004 
CRISIS 0.007** 0.001 0.003 0.007*** 
 
0.003 0.006 0.002 0.002 
Constant 0.058*** 0.742*** -0.016 0.030*** 
 
0.017 0.035 0.012 0.010 
Number of Observations 40740 38567 45181 45872 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.711 0.581 0.700 0.577 
 The data is gathered from the Compustat Global Industrials and Commercials database and is 
composed of the balance sheet and income statements for the companies in each country from 1996-
2009. TDTA is the ratio of total debt to total assets; SDTD is the ratio of short term debt to total debt; 
LTDTA is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; SDTA is the ratio of short term debt to total assets; 
EU is the EU accession dummy; EVEMU is the foreign exchange based EMU indicator; INT is lending 
rates; GRRGDP  is the growth rate of real GDP; DMGDP  is the deposit money bank assets to GDP 
ratio; STMO is the stock market turnover; FFGDP is the ratio of FDI flows to GDP; CRISIS is the crisis 
dummy; NFATA is the net fixed assets to total assets ratio; Size is the log of total assets and Profitability 
is the ROA ratio. In panels B1-C1 equations are estimated with EMU dummy and in panels B2-C2 
equations are estimated with EVEMU. For each variable, the first row is the beta coefficients and the 
second row is heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at firm level as in Petersen (2009). 
*** denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%.and * at 10%. 
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Table 11 
Corporate Financing Decisions of Small Firms during European Integration 
Panel A Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  TLTA CLTL LTDTA CLTA 
EU -0.054* -0.017 0.027* -0.055** 
 
0.028 0.026 0.015 0.025 
EVEMU 0.023 0.029 -0.020* 0.041* 
 
0.026 0.030 0.012 0.022 
INT*EU15 0.791** -0.464 0.439** 0.371 
 
0.349 0.350 0.182 0.285 
GRRGDP*EU15 -1.004*** 0.707*** -0.173 -0.482** 
 
0.239 0.210 0.117 0.199 
DMGDP*EU15 0.012 -0.010 -0.004 0.018 
 
0.017 0.025 0.009 0.016 
SMTO*EU15 0.016 -0.004 0.006 0.008 
 
0.011 0.012 0.006 0.010 
FFGDP*EU15 -0.061** -0.058*** -0.017* -0.061** 
 
0.028 0.021 0.009 0.026 
NFATA*EU15 0.114*** -0.151*** 0.089*** 0.027 
 
0.034 0.037 0.018 0.026 
SIZE*EU15 -0.004 -0.018*** 0.007** -0.013*** 
 
0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 
PROF*EU15 -0.037*** 0.002 -0.004 -0.027*** 
 
0.011 0.009 0.004 0.009 
INT*EUNMS -0.154 -0.192 0.013 -0.299* 
  0.215 0.185 0.078 0.159 
GRRGDP*EUNMS -0.646** -0.167 -0.111 -0.489** 
  0.303 0.357 0.217 0.233 
DMGDP*EUNMS 0.312 0.039 -0.019 0.272 
  0.290 0.390 0.195 0.246 
SMTO*EUNMS -0.112 -0.058 0.004 -0.081 
  0.098 0.090 0.056 0.061 
FFGDP*EUNMS 1.039** 0.182 0.128 0.677 
  0.432 0.559 0.302 0.444 
NFATA*EUNMS 0.025 -0.168* 0.072 -0.046 
  0.087 0.097 0.055 0.074 
SIZE*EUNMS 0.027 0.002 0.012 0.028 
  0.025 0.018 0.008 0.020 
PROF*EUNMS -0.053*** -0.034** 0.015** -0.059*** 
  0.019 0.016 0.007 0.017 
CRISIS -0.021** 0.040*** -0.015*** 0.006 
 
0.010 0.011 0.005 0.009 
Constant 0.431*** 0.893*** -0.014 0.373*** 
 
0.040 0.044 0.022 0.036 
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Number of Observations 9999 9999 9999 9999 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.630 0.592 0.515 0.632 
Panel B 
INT 0.019** 0.486 0.032** 0.037** 
GRRGDP 0.350 0.033** 0.801 0.980 
DMGDP 0.303 0.902 0.942 0.304 
SMTO 0.192 0.552 0.971 0.147 
FFGDP 0.011** 0.668 0.631 0.097* 
NFATA 0.343 0.870 0.776 0.347 
SIZE 0.013** 0.314 0.288 0.009*** 
PROF 0.022** 0.975 0.093* 0.011** 
 The data is gathered from the Compustat Global Industrials and Commercials database and is 
composed of the balance sheet and income statements for the companies in each country from 1996-
2009. The firms in the sample are divided into quartiles according to total asset size and the bottom 
25th percentile is defined as small firms. TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; CLTL is 
the ratio of current liabilities to total liabilities; LTDTA is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; 
CLTA is the ratio of current liabilities to total assets; INT is lending rates; GRRGDP  is the growth rate 
of real GDP; DMGDP  is the deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio; STMO is the stock market 
turnover; EU is the EU accession dummy; EVEMU is the foreign exchange based EMU indicator; 
FFGDP  is the ratio of FDI flows to GDP; CRISIS is the crisis dummy; NFATA is the net fixed assets 
to total assets ratio; Size is the log of total assets and Profitability is the ROA ratio. All firm specific 
and macro variables except for dummies are interacted with EU15 (EUNMS) dummy, which takes 
on value one (zero) if it is an EU-15 country and zero (one) otherwise. In panel B we present p-values 
for the F-test of equality of coefficients X(EU15)=X(EUNMS), where X represents the firm and 
macro level variables. For each variable, the first row is the beta coefficients and the second row is 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at firm level as in Petersen (2009). *** denotes 
significant at 1%, ** at 5%.and * at 10%. 
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Table 12  
Corporate Financing Decisions of Non-Survivor Firms During European Integration 
Panel A Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  TLTA CLTL LTDTA CLTA 
EU -0.034* 0.090 -0.086 0.090 
 
0.019 0.067 0.060 0.062 
EVEMU 0.075*** -0.008 0.039** 0.038* 
 
0.023 0.022 0.015 0.023 
INT*EU15 0.682 0.190 0.154 0.805 
 
0.487 0.468 0.296 0.556 
GRRGDP*EU15 -1.693*** 0.100 -0.201 -1.338** 
 
0.504 0.410 0.313 0.541 
DMGDP*EU15 0.006 -0.030 0.018 -0.005 
 
0.025 0.020 0.015 0.024 
SMTO*EU15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FFGDP*EU15 0.014 -0.098 0.038 -0.016 
 
0.097 0.077 0.058 0.089 
NFATA*EU15 0.068 -0.011 0.029 0.089 
 
0.069 0.065 0.040 0.071 
SIZE*EU15 0.027*** -0.012 0.010* 0.009 
 
0.009 0.009 0.005 0.009 
PROF*EU15 -0.011 0.019*** -0.007 0.002 
 
0.008 0.007 0.005 0.005 
INT*EUNMS -1.043 0.407 -0.842 -0.979 
  0.998 0.999 0.642 1.138 
GRRGDP*EUNMS 3.381*** 0.339 -0.600 3.091** 
  1.183 1.554 0.851 1.469 
DMGDP*EUNMS 0.403 0.345 0.154 0.338 
  0.284 0.464 0.166 0.409 
SMTO*EUNMS 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
FFGDP*EUNMS -0.375 0.312 -0.857* -0.330 
  0.473 1.009 0.489 0.886 
NFATA*EUNMS 0.054 0.354 -0.239 0.033 
  0.184 0.455 0.288 0.336 
SIZE*EUNMS 0.013 -0.035 -0.027 0.038 
  0.050 0.078 0.064 0.059 
PROF*EUNMS -0.329** 0.395 -0.151 0.550 
  0.158 0.454 0.248 0.546 
CRISIS -0.103** 0.088** -0.058** -0.042 
 
0.049 0.039 0.028 0.046 
Constant 0.405*** 0.678*** 0.126* 0.184** 
 
0.062 0.089 0.073 0.089 
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Number of Observations 2578 2578 2578 2578 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.768 0.729 0.702 0.709 
Panel B 
INT 0.174 0.863 0.213 0.220 
GRRGDP 0.000*** 0.879 0.676 0.007*** 
DMGDP 0.110 0.353 0.357 0.337 
SMTO 0.770 0.264 0.692 0.463 
FFGDP 0.383 0.644 0.042** 0.689 
NFATA 0.947 0.379 0.306 0.860 
SIZE 0.761 0.745 0.519 0.601 
PROF 0.019** 0.340 0.501 0.246 
 The data is gathered from the Compustat Global Industrials and Commercials database and is 
composed of the balance sheet and income statements for the companies in each country from 1996-
2009. Non-survivor companies are defined as companies who are inactive for one of the following 
reasons: bankruptcy, liquidation, reverse acquisition, leveraged buyout, or the company no longer 
files with the SEC. TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; CLTL is the ratio of current 
liabilities to total liabilities; LTDTA is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; CLTA is the ratio of 
current liabilities to total assets;  INT is the lending rates; GRRGDP  is the growth rate of real GDP; 
DMGDP  is the deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio; STMO is the stock market turnover; EU is 
the EU accession dummy; EVEMU is the foreign exchange based EMU indicator; FFGDP  is the ratio 
of FDI flows to GDP; CRISIS is the crisis dummy; NFATA is the net fixed assets to total assets ratio; 
Size is the log of total assets and Profitability is the ROA ratio. All firm specific and macro variables 
except for dummies are interacted with EU15 (EUNMS) dummy, which takes on value one (zero) if 
it is an EU-15 country and zero (one) otherwise. In panel B we present p-values for the F-test of 
equality of coefficients X(EU15)=X(EUNMS),.where X represents the firm and macro level 
variables. For each variable, the first row is the beta coefficients and the second row is 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level as in Petersen (2009). *** 
denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%.and * at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
